供应链、能源与阵营化：梳理2026 AI投资的核心主线

Original title: My 2026 Outlook: The Year Geopolitics Becomes the Macro

Original author: Steve Hou

Translation by: Peggy

Editor's note: The overarching macro theme for 2026 may no longer be a routine cyclical shift, but rather the pricing-in of a geopolitical restructuring. For decades, the US maintained the global system’s operation as the guarantor of trade, security, and financial order. Today, as the US share of global GDP declines and domestic political constraints tighten, this model is shifting from "global coverage" to a more bounded "bloc system."

The core judgment of this article is that the investment framework for the coming year should move from a traditional "growth-inflation" cycle analysis towards an assessment of strategic blocs, supply chain reshaping, and the direction of capital expenditure. The key questions are: who falls within the US-preferred supply chain? Who possesses credible institutions, industrial capabilities, and energy carrying capacity? These entities are likely to become beneficiaries of a new wave of global asset revaluation. Japan, South Korea, Latin America, European industrial leaders, as well as power grids, energy storage, automation, robotics, and AI infrastructure, are all included in this logical chain.

The article particularly emphasizes that manufacturing reshoring is not just a political slogan, but a systemic reallocation constrained by labor, energy, power grids, and security boundaries. The US cannot complete all production internalization on its own, which increases the importance of allied economies. Energy and power grids become the hard constraints of industrial policy. AI, as the core battleground in US-China competition, will continue to drive intense investment in computing power, electricity, networks, and the manufacturing stack.

For investors, this means that opportunities in 2026 may not lie in the crowded momentum trades of US mega-cap tech stocks, but in finding global "picks and shovels" players for this restructuring: electrical equipment, industrial automation, energy storage, grid infrastructure, defense bottleneck segments, and non-US markets benefiting from supply chain redesign. This article offers not a single asset recommendation, but a geopolitical framework for understanding global macro and asset rotation in 2026.

Below is the original text:

The defining feature of 2026 will not be a standard business cycle turning point, but a watershed moment in an already-unfolding great geopolitical restructuring. For decades, the US played an expansive role in the global economy: anchoring global trade flows, underwriting the security order, and acting as the de facto guarantor of the post-war system. But this model is changing because the structural arithmetic has shifted: the US share of global GDP can no longer support commitments of equal breadth, and its domestic political constraints increasingly point towards strategic retrenchment.

This does not mean US influence is disappearing; it means it is being reconfigured. The US is moving from a broadly encompassing global posture towards clearer "blocs": preferred supply chains, trusted investment channels, and more selective, regionalized security commitments. This has been the core catalytic factor behind a series of major correct judgments over the past two years, and it will remain the primary framework for understanding 2026.

In this new landscape, the most important question for investors becomes: who is inside this system of preference, who is excluded, and which assets will benefit from this redesign?

1) The New Bloc System: Winners are Production-oriented Economies Allied with the US

The outperforming emerging markets are not just those with favorable demographics, but economies with strategic alignment, stability, and productive capacity within the US-led system. Nations with civil liberties, institutional resilience, and democratic governance become important because the US bloc requires trust: trust in contracts, trust in political continuity, trust in intellectual property protection, and trust in supply chain security.

But more importantly, the "US bloc" is not limited to developing countries. It will also include developed economies with strategic industrial capabilities and technological depth. Japan and South Korea, for example, are natural beneficiaries as investment flows out of China and the BRICS bloc (excluding India). They are critical nodes in semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, and industrial robotics – the skeleton of the US bloc’s supply chain.

At the same time, the US itself faces a paradox. Politically, it wants manufacturing reshoring; strategically, it needs supply chain independence; but economically, it doesn't have enough labor to fully internalize the required production base. Simply put, the US does not have enough cheap, young labor to build the new supply chain entirely onshore. This limitation makes allied and quasi-allied regions even more critical.

2) Defense Restructuring: From 'Big Tent' to 'Regional Fortresses'

If the first layer of change occurs in the economic sphere, the second layer unfolds in the security realm. As the US moves from a 'big, open tent' to smaller, more defensible regional fortresses, the meaning of 'defense' will change markedly. The emerging strategy resembles a modernized Monroe Doctrine: focusing on protecting the near-abroad and critical chokepoints, rather than maintaining maximal global reach.

This shift makes Latin America central. This is the US backyard, and will be treated as such. The geopolitical logic is straightforward: supply chains cannot be secure if the neighborhood is unstable. This means political and institutional changes will be increasingly encouraged – implicitly or explicitly – to make the region suitable for large-scale capital deployment and integration into the US supply chain.

An important implication is that China's influence in Latin America will be gradually squeezed out over time. As the region shifts politically to the right and aligns more closely with the US, inflation and interest rates could fall, while growth could rise. The mechanism is not mysterious: foreign direct investment boosts capital expenditure, expands productive capacity, strengthens external balances, and improves currency creditworthiness.

This could create a virtuous cycle: increased trade, accelerated industrial upgrading, and economic growth that is broader and less dependent solely on commodity exports. Commodities will remain central, but their spillover effects will increasingly be felt in the financial and consumer discretionary sectors as domestic credit systems deepen and middle-class consumption becomes more resilient.

3) Energy: The Hard Constraint on Manufacturing Reshoring

Supply chain reshaping in the developed world faces a hard constraint: energy and grid capacity.

As the US, Europe, and allied economies attempt to reshore and secure production, they are discovering their domestic energy systems are woefully inadequate: aging grids, underinvestment, and strategic exposure to unreliable energy sources. This shapes a clear theme for 2026: energy scarcity will become a limiting factor for industrial policy.

This will drive a wave of investment impulses:

• Increasing energy imports from allies
• Accelerating renewable energy construction
• Renewed emphasis on nuclear power
• Massive upgrades to grid networks
• Expanding logistics and raw material needs

Solar and wind are already gaining momentum because they can scale faster than traditional baseload infrastructure. Nuclear cannot be built quickly through 'incremental' means; natural gas cannot ramp up easily without costly pipeline construction and permitting. In contrast, renewables can be deployed modularly, faster, more broadly, and with greater political ease for expansion.

Of course, the missing link is reliability. This is where energy storage comes in. Batteries are becoming critical tools for peak load management and grid stability. Continuous improvements in battery technology, coupled with increasing investment, are making the storage value chain increasingly strategic. The three themes of manufacturing reshoring, energy, and security converge here: the grid is becoming a national security asset.

4) Europe: Inside the Bloc, Growth-constrained, but Home to High-quality 'Picks and Shovels' Assets

Europe is likely to be one of the most misunderstood regions in 2026. With weaker demographics, higher energy costs, heavier regulation, and a less developed venture capital ecosystem than the US, Europe's growth ceiling remains low. In other words, Europe is unlikely to be the engine of the next cycle.

But Europe's importance doesn't lie in its macro vitality, but in its industrial composition. In a fragmented world, Europe is firmly within the US camp. Moreover, in the areas where the new landscape will spur excessive investment, Europe still hosts some of the highest quality global companies: power equipment, electrification, grid infrastructure, and industrial automation.

This is why European equity markets could perform well even if the European economy lags: European indices are not just a reflection of 'European demand'. They are significantly composed of global exporters and multinational suppliers that serve the capital expenditure cycles happening worldwide.

### Defense: A Structural Valuation Uplift, Not Just a Momentum Trade

European defense spending has already shifted structurally, and the political consensus for stronger military capabilities is durable. However, since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, markets have repriced much of the easily accessible upside, and the conflict itself may be gradually entering a low-intensity phase. This means the European defense opportunity will be less about broad beta exposure and more focused on selective bottleneck segments: ammunition, security electronics, aerospace components, and maintenance and logistics.

### Power Equipment: Europe as the Electrification Backbone for a New CapEx Cycle

The real incremental opportunity lies in electrification and the grid. The developed world's power systems are the underlying bottleneck for manufacturing reshoring and AI. The problem isn't just generation, but the transmission and distribution equipment that cannot expand fast enough: transformers, switchgear, grid automation, power electronics, efficient motors, and system integration.

Europe's industrial base contains global leaders in these 'shovel' categories. Because they serve global capital expenditure rather than European domestic consumption, their earnings can grow even if European GDP growth is mediocre.

### Industrial Automation: Europe as an Enabler of Productivity Enhancement

Manufacturing reshoring and nearshoring will ultimately be constrained by labor scarcity and cost. The only way for high-wage developed economies to remain competitive with global manufacturing is through productivity enhancement and automation. Europe remains a leading supplier of factory automation systems, robotics, industrial sensors, control software, and precision tools.

Therefore, the correct way to position for Europe in 2026 is not as a macro 'European recovery' trade, but as a structural composition trade: hold those export-driven industrial and infrastructure leaders that benefit from global capital expenditure upgrades, while maintaining a more cautious stance on segments tied to domestic European demand.

5) AI: The Core Battleground of US-China Competition

If energy is the physical constraint on manufacturing reshoring, AI is the strategic constraint of this century. It is the most important battleground in US-China competition, because leadership in both nations increasingly views the race towards superintelligence as a defining issue.

China started later, took longer to catch up – starting from behind and facing chip embargoes – but the key is that it has already caught up enough to affect the landscape, and is pressing the accelerator. China's domestic AI capital expenditure was previously behind the US, but this gap is narrowing. This ensures AI will remain a target for massive investment regardless of short-term commercial returns, because it is increasingly viewed as strategic infrastructure, not an ordinary industry.

The implications for 2026 are straightforward:

AI CapEx and state-level coordination will continue to accelerate.

State support and intervention will increase in both blocs.

The AI value chain will undergo structural bifurcation: the US bloc and the China bloc will each take shape.

Duplicative construction means a greater total investment scale, doubly benefiting the computing, power, network, and manufacturing stacks.

Within this framework, AI should be understood broadly – not just generative models, but also embodied intelligence, automation, and robotics. 2026 could be the year of acceleration for robotics, with humanoid robots becoming a major narrative and CapEx destination.

Ultimately, the economic performance of the application layer may prove disappointing relative to infrastructure investment – until the inevitable shakeout arrives. But that is likely a story for 2027-2028. For 2026, the defining feature remains investment intensity, not monetization maturity.

6) Portfolio Implications: Rotating Away from Crowded US Mega-cap Tech

This macro landscape also explains why the global nature of our value chain index is crucial. The US stock market, especially US mega-cap tech, has become frothy and overly crowded in positioning. Both US domestic households and international investors hold significant concentrated positions in this sector. Even if the US retains structural strength, when positioning is extreme, the conditions for sustained momentum become less attractive.

This creates an opportunity: international stocks and non-tech stocks are the most thematically consistent way to express this outlook. This is especially true if 2026 becomes a year of rotation – potentially resembling the shift after 2000, even if the fundamentals aren't identical.

In other words, if geopolitics is reshaping supply chains, if energy becomes a hard constraint, if defense becomes regionalized, if AI CapEx remains relentless, then the path of least resistance is to hold the beneficiaries of this restructuring globally, rather than continuing to chase the momentum of a handful of US mega-cap tech stocks.

Conclusion: One Catalyst, Multiple Expressions

The coherence of the 2026 outlook lies in the fact that everything traces back to the same source: a geopolitical change redefining trade, security, energy, and technology competition. The correct framework is not 'growth vs. inflation', nor 'demographics vs. productivity'. The correct framework is: the world is being reorganized into different strategic blocs; supply chain redesign will force CapEx higher, drive risk repricing, and reshape winners and losers across regions and industries.

This has been the core catalytic factor behind every major structural judgment over the past two years. And it will also remain the most important macro perspective for understanding 2026.

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