三星打响第一枪,韩国财阀们「集体破防」了
- 核心观点:三星电子因AI芯片利润暴涨和人才流失压力,与工会达成了从税前营业利润中提取10.5%作为奖金的协议,此举打破了全球公司治理惯例,可能引发韩国财阀体系的劳资分配结构剧变。
- 关键要素:
- 协议内容:三星4.8万名员工将从DS事业部税前营业利润中获10.5%特别奖金,部分员工到手高达41.6万美元,罢工威胁推动签署。
- 行业背景:SK海力士先行实施类似利润分享(营业利润10%),因HBM市场领先,员工平均奖金约43万美元,引发三星人才流失。
- 争议焦点:奖金从税前利润提取,分配顺位优先于股东和税务机关,被韩国总统及法学界批评违背传统公司治理。
- 法律变量:2026年3月生效的“黄色信封法”放宽罢工合法性并限制企业索赔,导致10万名分包商工会迅速提出集体谈判。
- 连锁效应:协议后Kakao、LG Uplus等多家企业工会要求更高利润分成(13-30%),三星生物制药员工罢工至今。
- 市场反应:三星股价因罢工风险消除上涨8.5%,但长期奖金成本(年化约140亿美元)尚未被充分定价,可能侵蚀每股收益。
- 监测指标:后续需关注Kakao谈判结果、三星DS下半年利润指引及三星生物制药罢工走向,以判断财阀体系实际松动速度。
Original Source: Wall Street CN
Samsung's chip workers have been waiting for this day for a long time.
On May 27, 48,000 Samsung employees voted to approve a compensation agreement – they will receive 10.5% of the semiconductor division's pre-tax operating profit as a special bonus. For some memory chip workers, including retroactive bonuses, the amount in hand reaches as high as $416,000. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung said something at a cabinet meeting last week that clarified the nature of the matter: "Even investors can only receive dividends from post-tax net profit. How can workers take money before taxes?"
Even the president felt the workers had "cut in line." But Samsung had no choice but to accept this situation.
SK Hynix First Cracked Open the Door
The story starts with SK Hynix.
Over the past two years, HBM (High Bandwidth Memory) has become the scarcest component in AI infrastructure. No matter how powerful Nvidia's GPUs are, they cannot run without HBM. In this market, SK Hynix has captured the largest share, while Samsung has been playing catch-up. SK Hynix's profits have subsequently surged – its projected full-year operating profit for 2026 is nearly 250 trillion won, equivalent to approximately $170 billion. According to its regulations, 10% of operating profit is directly distributed to employees. This year, the average bonus per employee is expected to reach 600 million won, roughly $430,000, equivalent to 2964% of the base salary.
Samsung's chip workers did the math, and then started to leave.
According to Samsung's union, employees are "leaving in droves" for SK Hynix. It's not just about the money; the gap in pay behind a clear signal: SK Hynix won this round of the AI memory competition, and it can offer such compensation; Samsung is behind in HBM, and it cannot. This talent drain, in turn, hampers Samsung's technological catch-up speed, creating a vicious cycle.
By this year, the situation became untenable. 48,000 workers threatened to strike for 18 days. In Q1 2026, Samsung's DS division alone posted an operating profit of 53.7 trillion won, exceeding its total for the entire year of 2025. It could afford the bonuses, but it couldn't afford the 18-day shutdown.
And so the agreement was signed. Samsung became the second major company in South Korea to formally link a fixed percentage of operating profit to employee bonuses in writing.
Cutting in Line Before Tax: An Unprecedented Arrangement in Global Corporate Governance
What truly unsettled the business world about this agreement wasn't the amount, but those two words – pre-tax.
The usual logic is: a company makes money, pays taxes first, and from the remaining net profit, part is retained and part is distributed to shareholders. Employee bonuses are accounted for as costs, deducted from revenue, and are separate from profit distribution. Now, Samsung workers are receiving a fixed percentage directly carved out from operating profit (pre-tax). Their distribution priority is after the tax authorities but before shareholders.
Kim Ki-chang, a law professor at Korea University, stated this violates the "long-standing practice of global corporate governance." President Lee Jae-myung put it more bluntly: investors' dividends come from post-tax net profit, so why should workers get paid before shareholders?
SK Hynix actually did the same thing earlier, but it didn't cause such a stir at the time. Samsung is different – in 2010, its sales alone accounted for 22% of South Korea's GDP. What Samsung agrees to becomes an industry standard in Korea.
The Federation of Korean Industries issued a statement with unusually strong wording: "Samsung's special situation should not be generalized by labor groups and spread across the entire industry." This statement itself reveals the problem: they know they can't stop it, so they can only say "don't copy."
Three Variables Aligned Simultaneously, the Chaebol Couldn't Stop It This Time
The South Korean chaebol system had suppressed labor for decades using three things: opaque profits (workers didn't know how much the company made), weak unions (unionization rate was only 13% in 2024), and limited legal protection (strikes were costly, and companies could claim damages).
This year, cracks appeared in all three simultaneously.
The AI chip boom made the profits of Samsung and SK Hynix completely transparent – every quarter, when earnings are released, the whole world knows how much these two companies earned. Armed with the numbers, workers had the leverage to demand. With SK Hynix earning more in a single quarter than Samsung made in some entire years, when workers say "I want 10%," management no longer has the "the company has no money" card to play.
The Yellow Envelope Law, effective this March, changed the power dynamics. This law expanded the definition of "employer": if a company has "substantial control" over workers' labor conditions, even without a direct employment relationship, it can be required to negotiate. Within two days of the law taking effect, 100,000 subcontractor union members submitted collective bargaining requests to their parent companies. It also legalized strikes against mass layoffs and factory closures. One of the companies' best tools to suppress unions – "If you strike, I'll close the factory" – lost its legal effect.
SK Hynix was the third piece of the puzzle. It did the same thing before Samsung, yet it wasn't knocked down; instead, it had higher profits, more talent, and a better stock price. This broke the most important psychological barrier of the chaebols: "No one has ever done this before." Now someone has, and they did it well, and other unions noticed.
The simultaneous alignment of these three variables is not a coincidence; it's structural.
Samsung's 10.5% Became Everyone Else's Starting Point
Before the ink was even dry on the agreement, unions across the country immediately treated it as a baseline, not a ceiling.
Unions from five Kakao affiliates jointly demanded 13-15% of operating profit, significantly higher than Samsung’s, threatening a collective strike otherwise; the labor-management committee is mediating. LG Uplus and HD Hyundai Heavy Industries were even more direct, demanding 30%, nearly three times the Samsung agreement. Employees at Samsung's own biopharmaceutical division have already been on strike for a full five days, demanding 20%. Management hasn't budged an inch, and employees are refusing overtime and holiday work, entering a protracted struggle.
None of the unions following this trend are chip companies, and they don't have the profit thickness of Samsung’s DS division. But their logic is: if Samsung gave it, why can't we get it?
The psychological barrier of the chaebols shattered the moment Samsung signed.
The more critical change is at the legal level. The Yellow Envelope Law, effective this March, essentially shut down the channels companies used to sue striking unions for damages. In the past, one of the most effective tools for chaebols to suppress unions was "If you strike, I'll sue you and bankrupt you" – some unions were ordered to pay billions of won in damages. This card is no longer effective. The cost for management to remain tough has shifted from "the union pays the price" to "both sides exhausting resources," changing the balance of leverage.
Within two days of the law taking effect, 100,000 subcontractor union members across South Korea submitted collective bargaining requests to their parent companies. Workers waited a long time for this door to open, and once it did, there was no holding it back.
Of course, this battle isn't a total rout for the chaebols. The opposing arguments have substance: Samsung and SK Hynix's concessions are based on the exceptional context of surging AI profits; Kakao, LG Uplus, and Hyundai Heavy Industries don't have as solid a profit base. Whether the 30% demand sticks at the negotiating table is questionable. Samsung Biologics' management held firm for 5 days of strikes, proving that not all chaebols will follow Samsung's path.
Even if non-chip companies eventually settle for 10% or 15%, rather than 30%, that would be an unprecedented outcome in the decades-long history of Korean chaebols. A union demanding 30% and getting 15% is a world away from getting nothing in the past.
The outcome of the Kakao negotiation is the first real test of how far this story can go. If it concludes with any form of profit-sharing agreement, the "collective breach" of the chaebols is confirmed. If negotiations break down and the strike is suppressed, Samsung remains an isolated case, and this fire won't spread for now.
Samsung's Stock Price Rose, but the Market Missed the Most Important Thing
On the day the agreement was signed, Samsung Electronics' stock price rose 8.5%, hitting an all-time high.
The market priced in the "resolution of strike risk" – the threat of an 18-day shutdown was gone, production continuity was restored. Combined with the optimistic sentiment for AI chip demand driven by Nvidia's strong earnings report, Samsung had reason to rise.
But the long-term cost pressure of 10.5% has not yet been fully priced in.
Samsung's DS division posted a Q1 2026 operating profit of 53.7 trillion won. If this pace continues for the full year, the bonus pool would approach 20 trillion won (about $14 billion). Part of this is paid out in the form of treasury shares, easing immediate cash pressure, but the dilutive effect of treasury shares is real, and the long-term erosion of earnings per share (EPS) and return on equity (ROE) is unavoidable.
The watershed moment will be the profit guidance for the second half of the year. If the DS division maintains high profits in H2, the market will gradually digest the cost pressure, and the re-pricing will focus on the progress of catching up in HBM. If profit growth slows down while bonus costs persist, the mid-term pressure will become more apparent in valuations.
SK Hynix faces the same cost equation, but its technological advantage in HBM gives it stronger pricing power. The increased costs are offset by higher profits – currently, it appears to be the stronger player in Korea's chip sector.
Three things to watch next: the outcome of the Kakao negotiation, the first test of whether the domino effect holds; Samsung DS's profit guidance for the second half, determining the actual weight of the 10.5% cost; and the trajectory of the Samsung Biologics strike, indicating the speed of internal loosening within the chaebol system.
Samsung fired the first shot, and the bullet is already in the air. Whether Korea's chaebols can hold onto their respective purses will be answered in the coming weeks.


