Crypto US Stock Watch: What are CRCL, HOOD, COIN, and MSTR trading recently?

Over the past few weeks, three noteworthy trends have emerged at the intersection of U.S. equities and Crypto.

Circle (CRCL.M) is still digesting the pressure from declining USDC circulation and the cooling of on-chain DeFi; Robinhood (HOOD.M) has regained market favor by building its own public chain, further transferring competitive pressure to Coinbase (COIN.M); Strategy (MSTR.M) has begun to materially sell Bitcoin, breaking the market's long-held perception that it only buys and never sells.

As of the close on July 8, CRCL.M, HOOD.M, COIN.M, and MSTR.M were at $64.07, $113.53, $159.36, and $93.87 respectively. On the surface, they all sit at the intersection of U.S. equities and Crypto, but the core variables driving their stock prices have recently diverged significantly:

• Circle's focus is returning to USDC circulation and DeFi vitality;
• The competition between Robinhood and Coinbase is extending from trading platforms to asset issuance, user acquisition, and on-chain settlement;
• Strategy is no longer just facing Bitcoin price fluctuations, but a balancing act between mNAV, financing costs, and cash expenditures;

In other words, the market is pricing different things for each of them.

1. Circle: Bubble Deflation, USDC Regains Its Role as CRCL's Pricing Anchor

The most noteworthy change for Circle currently is that the relationship between the CRCL.M stock price and USDC is gradually transitioning from the initial post-IPO decoupling towards a fundamental consensus.

MSX Maitong has charted the comparison curve between CRCL.M's stock price and USDC circulation since Circle's listing, clearly showing two distinct pricing phases.

The first phase was the valuation digestion period post-Circle IPO, roughly lasting from June 2025 to year-end.

Back then, as the first major stablecoin issuer listed on U.S. stocks, CRCL.M's price was driven by factors like scarcity, low float, and IPO sentiment, once reaching an all-time closing high of $263.45, far exceeding changes in USDC's fundamentals.

Subsequently, as the low-float premium and listing euphoria faded, a sustained valuation regression began. During this period, USDC circulation was still growing, resulting in opposite directional movements of the two curves and significantly lowering the full-cycle correlation coefficient.

The second phase began around late 2025 to early 2026. As the initial IPO valuation bubble gradually deflated, CRCL's marginal pricing started to realign with USDC circulation and Circle's operational data, with the directional resonance of the two curves significantly strengthening:

• From late January to early February, USDC circulation rapidly declined, and CRCL simultaneously tested its phase lows;
• From February to mid-March, USDC resumed expansion, peaking at approximately $79.6 billion, and CRCL rebounded significantly;
• After late March, USDC growth stalled and gradually turned into net contraction, with CRCL subsequently re-entering a downward channel;
• By July 6, USDC circulation had dropped to approximately $73.7 billion, a decrease of about $5.9 billion or roughly 7.4% from the March peak.

The fundamental reason behind this is that USDC is the most critical balance sheet variable in Circle's current revenue model. For instance, in Q1 2026, its reserve income reached $653 million, accounting for approximately 94% of total revenue and reserve income, up 17% year-over-year.

This growth primarily stemmed from a 39% year-over-year increase in average USDC in circulation, partially offsetting the 66 basis point decline in reserve yields.

After all, Circle's other income during the same period was only about $42 million...

This also means that Circle's current profit logic can still be roughly simplified as "average USDC circulation × reserve asset yield - distribution costs - operating expenses."

Of course, reserve income is not equivalent to shareholder profits. Circle must also pay significant fees to Coinbase, exchanges, and other distribution channels, but it sufficiently illustrates the sensitivity of operating results to USDC scale.

Further tracking reveals that USDC circulation itself is closely tied to the risk appetite and capital demand of the Crypto market, especially DeFi. This is why a DeFi downturn directly impacts USDC—because the vast majority of USDC demand originates from on-chain lending protocols, perpetual contracts, liquidity pools, and institutional on-chain settlement.

The common characteristic of these scenarios is that capital isn't just transiently passing through USDC; it needs to reside in protocols or accounts in USDC form for extended periods.

Therefore, when DeFi activity rises, capital flows into lending, trading, and liquidity protocols, often leading to a concurrent increase in the demand for USDC; conversely, when confidence in DeFi wanes, investors redeem funds, deleverage, and exit on-chain yield strategies. USDC might then be transferred back to exchanges, swapped for other stablecoins, or redeemed directly for dollars.

The KelpDAO/rsETH incident in April this year was a classic stress test. In this attack, undercollateralized rsETH was used as collateral for borrowing in protocols like Aave, rapidly spreading risk across collateral, lending pools, and yield strategies.

Within 48 hours of the event, total DeFi TVL dropped from approximately $99.497 billion to $86.286 billion, a decrease of about $13.21 billion, or roughly 13.3%.

Aave's TVL alone fell from around $26.4 billion to $17.9 billion, as many users attempted to withdraw stablecoins, creating sustained net outflow pressure on on-chain capital. Temporally, this also corresponds to the point where USDC began contracting after reaching its phase peak of ~$79.6 billion, and CRCL weakened again after its March rebound.

However, theoretically, CRCL's stock price is also influenced by factors like interest rate expectations, market risk appetite, earnings guidance, and valuation levels. USDC cannot explain all volatility, but after the IPO scarcity premium has faded, it is increasingly becoming Circle's most important high-frequency fundamental indicator.

So, how should we identify the turning point for CRCL's stock price going forward?

From a trading perspective, observing a single week of USDC issuance isn't sufficient to confirm a CRCL reversal, as short-term issuance might stem from single-institution rebalancing, exchange liquidity replenishment, or temporary settlement needs. What matters more is whether three sets of signals resonate consecutively:

• Is DeFi activity recovering? Focus on whether TVL, lending demand, stablecoin deposits, and protocol revenue in core protocols like Aave/Sky, Morpho, Pendle, and Lido are recovering simultaneously. Only when capital re-enters protocols, generating real collateral, trading, and yield demand, will sustainable USDC demand be created;
• Is single-week USDC issuance turning into continuous net issuance? Circle discloses USDC issuance, redemptions, and circulation changes weekly. Consecutive net issuance for two to four weeks is more meaningful, reducing noise from short-term capital allocation;
• Is Circle's profit expectation no longer negated by rate cuts and distribution costs? Even if USDC recovers, if the Fed cuts rates rapidly, or if Circle cedes more reserve yield to compete for channels like Hyperliquid or exchanges, the contribution of USDC growth to shareholder profits could be lower than expected. Therefore, observe whether reserve yields, distribution costs, and the profit margin after deducting distribution costs stabilize.

In a nutshell, when DeFi TVL, stablecoin lending demand, and protocol revenue begin to recover concurrently, and USDC resumes net issuance for several consecutive weeks, a tradable upside inflection point may emerge in CRCL.M's fundamentals.

Beyond this, Circle is also working to make USDC the core quote and settlement asset for on-chain trading platforms like Hyperliquid, while expanding into CPN cross-border payments, the Arc public chain, and AI Agent payment infrastructure.

These initiatives will determine whether Circle can gradually break free from a valuation framework overly reliant on "earning spreads from Treasury reserves and depending on Coinbase/Base for distribution."

But at least in the short term, the resonance between DeFi activity and weekly net USDC issuance remains the most direct signal for judging a fundamental turning point for CRCL.

2. Robinhood Chain: Putting Pressure on Coinbase, More Than Just Another L2

On July 1, Robinhood officially launched the Robinhood Chain mainnet.

It is an Ethereum L2 built on Arbitrum technology, but Robinhood's goal is clearly not just to create another general-purpose public chain. Instead, it aims to gradually connect its own brokerage business, stock tokens, wallet, lending, perpetual contracts, and AI trading capabilities into an on-chain issuance and settlement system under its control.

Currently, new-generation Robinhood stock tokens can be traded 24/7 on Robinhood Chain, enter lending pools, or be used as collateral for other DeFi transactions. Its wallet also connects to on-chain trading platforms like Uniswap and Lighter. Robinhood Earn offers stablecoin lending services via Morpho.

The capital market responded swiftly, with Robinhood's stock price jumping 8.35% on July 1, closing at $113.53 on July 8, up about 13% from June 30.

However, a closer comparison reveals that the differences between this chain and Coinbase's Base are not primarily in underlying technology or TPS, but in the user and distribution entry points each controls:

• Base is closer to native crypto users, aiming to be a general on-chain operating system for developers, stablecoin payments, and AI Agents;
• Robinhood Chain starts with traditional brokerage users, attempting to bring assets like stocks and ETFs directly into on-chain trading and DeFi;

Frankly speaking, Robinhood Chain is hardly a "Base killer" in the short term.

According to statistics compiled by Coinbase based on Artemis data, in Q1 2026, Base accounted for approximately 62% of global adjusted stablecoin transaction volume, and over 90% of on-chain AI Agent stablecoin transaction volume occurred on Base.

Coinbase's advantage in stablecoin distribution is equally significant. In Q1, its products held an average of approximately $19 billion in USDC, over a quarter of total USDC circulation, and captured about 50% of USDC's overall economic benefits over the past year.

This means Base possesses not just on-chain traffic, but also a network effect built from Coinbase's exchange, custody, institutional clients, and USDC distribution. Whether from the perspective of stablecoin balances, developer ecosystem, or on-chain liquidity, Robinhood Chain will struggle to directly challenge Base's established advantages in the near term.

But the deeper threat Robinhood poses to Coinbase isn't about taking away Base's TVL in the short term.

It is more about proving that a publicly traded brokerage with tens of millions of retail users, a brokerage license, and a gateway to securities assets can also build its own wallet, public chain, and on-chain financial products, keeping users, assets, order flow, and fees within its own ecosystem as much as possible.

If Coinbase follows a path "from Crypto outward to traditional finance," then Robinhood Chain represents a completely opposite path—starting from U.S. stocks and the brokerage system, moving in reverse into Crypto and on-chain finance.

From this perspective, Coinbase controls native crypto users, stablecoins, and on-chain infrastructure; Robinhood controls traditional investors, securities accounts, and stock assets. When both types of platforms eventually converge on a complete "account + asset + trading + wallet + public chain" system, the battle will no longer be just for a single chain's developers or TVL, but for who can become the next-generation cross-asset financial gateway.

An intriguing observation sample is that shortly after the Robinhood Chain mainnet launch, a wave of meme token speculation emerged, similar to what Base saw in its early days. For example, the token "$1" borrows from Robinhood's long-standing brand memory of "low-barrier investing" where you can buy for as little as $1.

As the speculative frenzy around related tokens heated up quickly, many existing Robinhood users who traded U.S. stocks began inquiring en masse about how to get on-chain and buy memes.

These memes naturally have no direct connection to the stock tokens officially launched by Robinhood, but for a new chain, they are arguably the most efficient cold-start tool, capable of quickly attracting native on-chain capital, traders, and developers into the new ecosystem.

From this perspective, the meme craze at least indicates that Robinhood Chain can not only carry traditional assets but also has the potential to attract native crypto capital and speculative traffic, potentially becoming the most differentiated source of incremental on-chain traffic growth.

Of course, Robinhood Chain's business loop is not yet fully formed. According to Robinhood's official disclosures, Robinhood Chain currently operates independently of its main brokerage and crypto accounts. It is not yet a settlement network fully integrated with existing brokerage accounts, funds, and order systems.

But the change has irreversibly occurred.

In the past, Coinbase enjoyed a scarcity premium as "the purest Crypto infrastructure platform in the U.S. stock market." However, as Robinhood builds its own on-chain settlement network, this scarcity is being gradually diluted. Coinbase is no longer the only public company capable of bundling traditional financial assets, stablecoins, trading, and a public chain together.

Therefore, the near-term impact of Robinhood Chain on Coinbase might not immediately appear in Base's TVL or Coinbase's current revenue. What is more concerning is that COIN.M's long-term valuation narrative and infrastructure scarcity are being re-evaluated.

3. Strategy's Turning Battleship: From 'Buy, Buy, Buy' to 'Starting to Sell'

Another development changing market perception comes from MicroStrategy, now known as Strategy.

Strictly speaking, this was not Strategy's first time selling Bitcoin. The company sold 32 BTC in early June, but the consecutive sale of 3,588 Bitcoin from June 29 to July 5 truly carried symbolic significance at the capital management level:

• On June 29 and 30, it sold 1,363 BTC at an average price of approximately $59,256, realizing about $80.8 million;
• From July 1 to 5, it sold 2,225 BTC at an average price of approximately $60,773, realizing about $135.2 million;

These two transactions totaled approximately $216 million. The funds were used to pay preferred stock dividends and replenish the dollar reserves drawn down for that purpose. As of July 5, Strategy still held 843,775 BTC, with an average cost basis of approximately $75,476; its dollar reserves stood at approximately $2.55 billion.

In terms of scale, this sale represented only about 0.42% of its Bitcoin holdings before the sale. It clearly doesn't indicate a systematic bearish turn on Bitcoin. However, it broke an important psychological anchor for the market—Strategy's Bitcoin is no longer just a reserve permanently locked on the balance sheet; it can also be actively sold to meet the real-world costs of its capital structure.

So why now?

Over the past few years, Strategy's business model could be simplified into a one-way funding flywheel: "Issue common stock, convertible bonds, or preferred stock → Use proceeds to buy Bitcoin → BTC appreciation boosts net assets and stock price → Rely on valuation premium to continue raising funds to buy more Bitcoin."

The most critical variable in this model is MSTR's premium relative to its Bitcoin net asset value, commonly referred to as mNAV.

This means:

• When MSTR's mNAV is significantly above 1x, the company can issue stock at a price higher than its Bitcoin net asset value. Using the proceeds to buy BTC, if the issuance price is high enough, this operation can increase the amount of Bitcoin per share, achieving what is known as "accretion";
• But when mNAV contracts towards 1x, the effectiveness of issuing more common stock diminishes rapidly. The financing obtained may no longer offset the dilution caused by new shares.

Ultimately, when equity financing is no longer attractive, the optimal direction for capital allocation may reverse, leading to the active decision to sell BTC to replenish cash.

This is the core change in the new capital management framework Strategy introduced on June 29. The framework includes a dollar reserve policy, STRC dividend policy, authorization for up to $1 billion in preferred securities repurchases, authorization for up to $1 billion in MSTR common stock repurchases, and a Bitcoin monetization plan. It clearly