港元穩定幣「大撤退」
- 核心觀點:港元穩定幣發行陷入「被動防禦」式監管困境,首批牌照由渣打和匯豐獲得,但兩家機構態度截然不同,市場整體缺乏商業熱情,導致港元穩定幣面臨「最早發牌、最冷啟動」的尷尬局面。
- 關鍵要素:
- 渣打牽頭碇點金融積極佈局,已啟動港元穩定幣HKDAP機構發行,並與Circle合作推出USDC接入服務;匯豐則態度消極,因穩定幣分流存款、侵蝕其以存貸利差為核心的85%支付業務收入模式,且合規穩定幣業務利潤有限。
- 螞蟻集團、京東科技、圓幣科技等有意願、有場景的公司未能獲得核心主導權,而持牌加密交易所對港元穩定幣普遍持「毫無期待」或「邊退邊看」態度,戰略上不積極,僅戰術上配合。
- 港元穩定幣困境非孤立現象:歐元穩定幣市值僅佔全球0.3%且由Circle主導,日元穩定幣受信託銀行體系限制淪為「電子存單」,韓元穩定幣因監管分歧停滯致資本連續18個月淨流出超過10億美元。
- 全球穩定幣市場約3083億美元,美元穩定幣佔98%,非美元穩定幣均因制度設計或商業驅動力不足而處於陪跑狀態。
Original Author: Joe Zhou, Foresight News
"We are not optimistic about the HKD stablecoin." An industry insider close to regulatory authorities told this journalist bluntly, "Being optimistic about stablecoins doesn't mean being optimistic about the HKD stablecoin—these are two completely different things."
He paused, then added another sentence: "Letting the institutions with the least willingness and the least motivation lead the HKD stablecoin, while marginalizing the institutions with the most motivation and the most ideas—how can this possibly work?"
This is not a personal bias. This journalist learned from multiple participants in Hong Kong's stablecoin business that the allocation of the first two HKD stablecoin licenses has already reflected the awkwardness of this "passive defense" regulatory approach: Anchor Point Financial Technology Limited, led by Standard Chartered, is actively pushing forward, while the other licensed institution "fundamentally doesn't want to do it"—this is already an open secret within the industry.
Meanwhile, companies with strong intentions to explore HKD stablecoin scenarios, such as Ant Group, JD Technology, and Yuen Coin Technology, have failed to truly enter the game or lack core decision-making power.
"Participating, but not optimistic." Two individuals from different institutions who are both close to Hong Kong's stablecoin business said almost in unison.
Currently, the situation of the HKD stablecoin is taking on three subtle forms: one type of institution is optimistic about the stablecoin track but holds reservations about the HKD stablecoin, yet feels compelled to "reserve a seat"; another type of institution is not enthusiastic about stablecoins themselves but is being pushed reluctantly into the game by regulators; a third type has the willingness, resources, and use cases but is shut out due to their identity.
This misalignment is precisely the most authentic footnote to the "great retreat" of the HKD stablecoin.

One License, Two Attitudes, Three Reactions
Standard Chartered is proactive, HSBC is passive—one license, two attitudes.
In September 2025, 36 institutions rushed to submit applications for HKD stablecoin licenses, making quite a scene. But nearly a year later, as of today in August 2026, few people actively mention the HKD stablecoin anymore.
Once the noise faded, only two real players remained: Standard Chartered and HSBC. A brand-new business model was ultimately handed over entirely to institutions focused on traditional business models. Market sentiment is cold as ice.
"That HSBC is not proactive is well known within the industry." Two individuals from different licensed crypto exchanges in Hong Kong told this journalist simultaneously.
On April 10, 2026, the HKMA issued the first two HKD stablecoin licenses to Anchor Point Financial Technology Limited (a joint venture of Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong), HKT, and Animoca Brands) and The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC). However, according to industry insiders, the two institutions have completely different attitudes toward stablecoins.
Standard Chartered has shown a certain level of initiative and has begun laying out a global stablecoin strategy. On July 2, 2026, Standard Chartered and Circle, the issuer of USDC, jointly announced the launch of an institutional-grade one-stop USDC access service. On August 12, 2026, Anchor Point Financial initiated the first phase of issuance of the HKD stablecoin HKDAP, which is currently only limitedly available to institutional distributors such as HashKey and OSL, as well as professional investors, with plans to potentially expand to retail users by the end of 2026 depending on market conditions.
HSBC presents a different picture. "HSBC is passive; they only did it because they were pointed at." An industry insider told this journalist bluntly. Compared to Standard Chartered's proactive advancement, HSBC's HKD stablecoin plan is clearly lagging, with a schedule set for the second half of 2026.
Behind this delay lies HSBC's prudent consideration of the stablecoin business based on real-world interests.
"HSBC prefers to promote tokenized deposits rather than stablecoins." A person close to HSBC revealed.
The root cause is that stablecoins directly conflict with HSBC's core business. Data shows that approximately 85% of HSBC's payment business revenue comes from deposit-based net interest income, and the payment business itself accounts for about 22% of its total revenue in 2025. HSBC's core business model is precisely about absorbing low-cost deposits and earning spreads through lending and investments—and stablecoin issuance would exactly divert bank deposits, shaking its foundation.
Moreover, the compliant stablecoin issuance business itself is far from a "windfall": revenue is highly dependent on the interest rate environment, while profits are eroded layer by layer by distribution, custody, and other channels. For HSBC, which relies on deposit-lending spreads as its core and holds massive customer deposits, proactively going all in on stablecoins would both erode its deposit base and fail to generate substantial profits—lacking intrinsic commercial motivation.
Beyond Standard Chartered and HSBC, the reactions of the 13 licensed crypto exchanges to the HKD stablecoin are also quite intriguing.
Standard Chartered and HSBC take on the issuance role, while distribution, custody, and other links depend on licensed crypto exchanges such as HashKey, OSL, EXIO, and Panthertrade. However, based on what this journalist has learned, the attitudes of these exchanges can roughly be divided into three categories.
First reaction: zero expectations. "From a commercial perspective, there's no visible opportunity for institutions to profit from the HKD stablecoin." A person from a licensed crypto exchange in Hong Kong said bluntly, "Besides, the licensed crypto exchanges in Hong Kong are currently suffering continuous losses themselves."
"Zero expectations." He said.
Second reaction: retreat while watching. According to this journalist's understanding, at least three licensed crypto exchanges were originally testing the HKD stablecoin with Anchor Point Financial Technology, but some exchanges have already begun to pull back, unwilling to invest too much effort in various tests.
Third reaction: tactically active, strategically wait-and-see. "Strategically not active, but tactically active." A person from another licensed crypto exchange in Hong Kong said. This practitioner revealed that their team is indeed actively testing cooperation with the HKD stablecoin issuer, but from the company's overall strategy perspective—"Everyone knows this is not a business where profit opportunities are visible at present."
EUR in a Panic, JPY Foolish, KRW Slow, HKD Dragging—All Are Running in Vain
The predicament of the HKD stablecoin is not unique to Hong Kong. Zooming out, non-USD stablecoins across global financial centers are almost universally running in vain.
EUR in a panic, JPY foolish, KRW slow, HKD dragging—one winner, four also-rans, each with its own difficulties.
First, the EUR stablecoin, as the second-largest currency by stored value after the USD, appears flustered.
The euro is the world's second-largest payment and reserve currency—SWIFT data shows that in June 2026, the euro accounted for 21.88% of global payment share, second only to the USD; in global foreign exchange reserves, the euro accounts for about 20%, firmly in second place. A currency that holds a 22% share in international trade and finance has a stablecoin that only represents 0.22% of the global market—a difference of a full 100 times.
Watching the USD stablecoin develop with such fervor, Europe is anxious, planning to launch a MiCA-compliant euro stablecoin in the second half of 2026. The membership has now expanded to 37 financial institutions covering 15 European countries, including major European banks such as BNP Paribas, ING Group, UniCredit, BBVA, and ABN AMRO.
However, while the alliance of 37 banks looks impressive, the reality is all bark, no bite. The euro stablecoin market cap is only $674 million, representing 0.3% of the global stablecoin market. And most of that 0.3% is held by an American company. Circle's EURC, with approximately $430 million, alone commands 64% of the entire euro stablecoin market.
"The JPY stablecoin is foolish." An industry insider said bluntly.
"It's not that the technology is inadequate; it's that the institutional design narrowed the path from the very start." "There's no liquidity now either." He added.
In June 2026, SBI Holdings officially launched JPYSC, Japan's first Ethereum-based yen stablecoin supported by a trust bank. Mitsubishi UFJ, Sumitomo Mitsui, and Mizuho—Japan's three major banks—also announced a joint development of their own yen stablecoin, planning to commence commercial transactions in fiscal year 2026. But the problem is that Japanese regulators have boxed the stablecoin within the trust bank system—the issuer must be a trust bank, reserve assets must be held in custody by a trust bank, and redemptions must also go through a trust bank. After all these rounds of operations, the stablecoin has been effectively turned into a "shackled electronic deposit certificate," having almost nothing to do with blockchain programmability.
Japan isn't incapable of making a stablecoin—the problem is that the thing they made is something no one would get excited about.
The KRW stablecoin is slow, stalled. It's not that companies don't want to do it; it's that regulators haven't finished arguing.
The pilot programs with the nine major card issuers are complete, BNK Busan Bank's pilot transactions on the Kaia Chain achieved a 100% success rate with processing times under 1 second, and the infrastructure built by Kakao and Circle is in place—companies are all ready, but regulators are still arguing in place.
Arguing about what? About "who gets to issue." The Bank of Korea insists that "banks must hold more than 51% of shares" to issue, while the industry strongly pushes back, arguing that "this isn't stability; it's stagnation." This is because Korea's Banking Act limits a bank's shareholding in other companies to a maximum of 15%—to reach 51%, you'd need at least 4 to 5 banks to join forces. This is itself just adding obstacles to the market.
The Financial Services Commission's bill has been pushed from Q1 to the "second half" [of the year], more than once. Money can't wait. Korea has seen net outflows of stablecoins for 18 consecutive months, cumulatively exceeding $1 billion—since domestic issuance isn't possible, users have no choice but to convert to USD stablecoins and move them out.
The "slowness" of the KRW stablecoin is not a capability problem; it's a decision problem.
The HKD stablecoin, meanwhile, is about waiting and dragging. Waiting for the U.S. clarity bill, waiting for banks to move slowly. Market assessment: the HKD stablecoin, first to receive a license, coldest to launch—a license without enthusiasm.
But the bigger problem is: those with use cases can't get in, and those without use cases are forced to do it. Ant wants to do it, JD wants to do it, HashKey wants to do it—they have the willingness, the motivation, and the use cases, but they're all outside the door. The HKD stablecoin was never an active offense; it has always been passive defense. Because others have done it, Hong Kong has no choice but to do it too.
The global stablecoin market is nearly $308.3 billion, with USD stablecoins accounting for 98%. The strength of the dollar is one reason, but the slowness of other regions is equally important. And the HKD stablecoin has already fallen into an awkward position.


