数字市场清晰法案 CLARITY Act 的争议性问题——是否允许稳定币生息收益？

This year, on March 20, the Senate Banking Committee reached a legislative compromise—the Tillis-Alsobrooks Compromise. This bipartisan agreement on the CLARITY Act addresses the biggest conflict between the banking and crypto industries over the past year: Should stablecoins be allowed to generate yield? From an initial blanket ban to the current policy of classifying interest-bearing stablecoins, the regulatory stance is shifting.

1. Before CLARITY: What Was the GENIUS Act's Stance on Stablecoins?

To understand the CLARITY Act, we must first revisit the "Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for US Stablecoins Act" (GENIUS Act, Pub. L. 119-27) passed last year.

To prevent financial shocks like the collapse of TerraUSD, the core objective of the GENIUS Act is clear: Prevent stablecoins from becoming substitutes for bank deposits, which could cause deposit outflows and credit contraction in the traditional banking system. To achieve macroprudential goals, legislators adopted a "one-size-fits-all" prohibition on yield generation at the issuer level.

According to Section 4(a)(11) of the GENIUS Act:

“No permitted payment stablecoin issuer or foreign payment stablecoin issuer shall pay the holder of any payment stablecoin any form of interest or yield (whether in cash, tokens, or other consideration) solely in connection with the holding, use, or retention of such payment stablecoin.”

"No permitted payment stablecoin issuer or foreign payment stablecoin issuer shall pay the holder of any payment stablecoin any form of interest or yield (whether in cash, tokens, or other consideration) solely in connection with the holding, use, or retention of such payment stablecoin."

In February of this year, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), in its proposed rule (OCC NPRM), developed anti-circumvention provisions involving a "rebuttable presumption" and "burden shifting" to prevent issuers from indirectly distributing interest to users through related parties or third-party white-label partners.

Under this legal framework, a Payment Stablecoin would be strictly defined as: a non-yielding, pure payment instrument (Sterile payment instrument) fully backed by high-quality liquid assets (such as short-term U.S. Treasuries and cash).

2. Yield-Generating Behavior: Shifting from Issuers to the Secondary Market

However, for the crypto market, as long as an interest rate differential exists in the underlying assets, the demand for yield will not cease. Since the jurisdiction of the GENIUS Act is limited to "stablecoin issuers," the crypto market quickly shifted yield-generating activities from the issuer end to the unregulated secondary market (e.g., exchanges) and DeFi protocols. Examples of such yield-generating methods include:

Governance Rewards: DeFi protocols distribute the yield generated from underlying reserve assets to users under the guise of "governance token rewards."

Liquidity Rewards and Staking: Users deposit non-yielding stablecoins into lending protocols or liquidity pools in exchange for "wrapped tokens" that carry yield-bearing attributes.

While these two methods ostensibly reward users for participating in network activities (e.g., voting, providing liquidity), many protocols are designed such that users need only incur minimal costs (e.g., voting once a year or using auto-delegation) to receive rewards that are economically equivalent to passive bank interest.

3. New Approach: Classifying Yield Generation in the CLARITY Act

The goal is to balance protecting the traditional banking industry and macroprudential requirements with preventing overly strict rules that stifle financial innovation.

According to the Tillis-Alsobrooks Compromise, regulators will attempt to differentiate and regulate stablecoin yield generation at the market level:

Prohibit "Passive Yield": If the yield is earned solely because a user simply "passively holds" a stablecoin balance in their account, it will be strictly prohibited.

Permit "Active / Activity-Based Yield": Exemptions will be granted for rewards genuinely tied to a user's crypto-native network activity, such as providing liquidity to automated market makers, merchant payment routing rebates, or genuine protocol governance and staking.

To define the boundary between the two, the bill introduces a test: the "Economic Equivalence Test". Permitted activity-based rewards:

Shall not be economically or functionally equivalent to the payment of interest on an interest-bearing bank deposit.

not economically or functionally equivalent to the payment of interest or yield on an interest-bearing bank deposit.

In other words, future regulators will gradually adopt a regulatory strategy of substantive review.

4. New Problem: Is Regulatory Capacity Sufficient for Substantive Review?

On the surface, this new regulatory strategy appears to be a legislative advancement, but we must further consider:

Will regulators truly have the capacity to identify such behavior in the future?

First, identifying technical "disguises" will be a key compliance challenge.

In the market, the line between "activity/behavior" and "passive holding" is extremely blurry. As mentioned earlier with governance rewards, if a smart contract requires a user to click a single authorization button, after which they continuously receive yield distributions, it can be commercially explained as "active participation." However, in economic substance, it is undoubtedly "passive yield generation." The "Economic Equivalence Test," lacking clear quantitative metrics (e.g., minimum voting participation rate or risk-bearing ratio), is highly questionable. In the near future, we will witness a game of "whack-a-mole," where the market can continuously devise new business models that technically meet the legal definition of "activity/behavior" but are economically equivalent to "passive interest."

Second, the "Economic Equivalence Test" far exceeds current regulatory enforcement capabilities.

Traditional financial regulation only requires reviewing institutional contracts and accounts. Under the new framework of the CLARITY Act, it would require enforcement personnel from the CFTC or SEC to audit the underlying smart contracts of DeFi protocols to assess whether a liquidity pool's yield fits the definition of "deposit interest." This demands both technical expertise and the ability to calibrate regulatory standards. In my view, regulatory agencies currently lack such identification capabilities.

Conclusion: From "Entity-Based Regulation" to "Ecosystem Regulation"

When we look further into the future, how will regulatory approaches change when financial functions are unbundled and dispersed, even decentralized, across countless nodes? If market participants can use blockchain features and financial engineering to package "passive deposits" as "activity rewards," the regulatory response will inevitably move towards "ecosystem regulation." Market oversight issues in the blockchain industry will become more certain and stable, but on the other hand, the entire industry will gradually bid farewell to the rampant frontier-exploration era of the past few years.

About Corundum

Corundum is an independent research brand focusing on AI Governance, Web3 Regulation, and Digital Finance. It concentrates on global digital asset regulation, AI governance, stablecoins, RWA, and the development of digital financial infrastructure.

Corundum is dedicated to providing industry practitioners, investment institutions, entrepreneurial teams, and policy researchers with original research content of long-term value through legal analysis, policy research, and a comparative law perspective, continuously tracking the evolution of the global digital economy regulatory system.

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Disclaimer

This article represents only the author's personal research views and is intended for learning, exchange, and discussion purposes only. It does not constitute any legal opinion, investment advice, or other professional advice. Readers should make independent judgments based on their own circumstances and consult relevant professionals when necessary.