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introduction:The ideal decentralized stablecoin should be fully transparent, non-custodial, with no or limited third-party control. Despite the huge scale of centralized stablecoins, the need to resist censorship caused by increasing regulatory pressure cannot be ignored, and the transparency of asset reserves of some centralized stablecoins has also been questioned, which is obviously contrary to the spirit of cryptocurrencies. Therefore, we believe that open and transparent, fully on-chain decentralized stablecoins are becoming more and more attractive.

Background

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According to Statista data, the total market value of stablecoins is about $150 Billion, accounting for about 15% of the total market value of cryptocurrencies. Among them, USDT, USDC, and BUSD occupy the 3rd, 5th, and 7th positions in the market value of cryptocurrencies respectively. As the main trading pair of CEX, USDT relies on its first-mover advantage to rule the first place in the total trading volume of the cryptocurrency market, while USDC is growing wildly by taking advantage of the east wind of DeFi Summer in 2020. The current coinage is close to USDT, BUSD It is an important infrastructure of Binance and BSC public chain. It can be seen that stablecoins play an indispensable role and status in the cryptocurrency ecology.

From a macro point of view, the biggest factor affecting the growth of stablecoins comes from the liquidity of the market. Although the Federal Reserve will maintain a strong interest rate hike in 2022, resulting in a direct cut of the overall cryptocurrency market value by nearly 60% from the beginning of the year, the market value of stablecoins Compared with 2021, it still has about doubled, and in 2022, it will stabilize at around $150 Billion. It is believed that as more and more users invest in cryptocurrencies in the future, there will be more use cases for stablecoins, which will promote stablecoins to become a trillion-dollar market.

The three stablecoins mentioned above have a common feature, that is, they are all issued by off-chain entity private companies (Tether, Circle and Binance), and all maintain their reserves with 1:1 fiat currency. These centralized stablecoins, although huge in scale, also face corresponding challenges.

1. For example, USDT reserves are not transparent enough, which has become a benchmark for shorting in a bear market. Using a centralized stablecoin whose reserves are not transparent enough essentially requires trust that the issuer (off-chain entity private enterprise) will always maintain a 1:1 solvency.

Therefore, this report will focus on decentralized stablecoins. A qualified decentralized stablecoin should be fully transparent, non-custodial, and have no or limited third-party control. With the increasing regulatory pressure on centralized stablecoins and the lack of transparency of asset reserves, we believe that decentralized stablecoins that are transparent and fully on-chain are becoming more and more attractive. Here we divide decentralized stablecoins into two broad categories:

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Crypto-Collateralized Stablecoins:1. A decentralized stablecoin pegged 1:1 to a fiat currency (usually USD)

ibTKNs-Collateralized Stablecoin：Stablecoins primarily generated by over-collateralization of cryptocurrencies. Typical examples are: DAI, LUSD, crvUSD and Synthetix USD. Among them, DAI supports a variety of mainstream cryptocurrencies and a small amount of interest-bearing tokens as collateral, while LUSD and crvUSD only support ETH as collateral. The casting of Synthetix USD mainly relies on the SNX token issued by the protocol itself.

Part algorithm, Part crypto-collateralized Stablecoin：The FRAX protocol introduces a concept that is partly backed by collateral and partly stabilized by an algorithm. The mortgage ratio can be seen as a confidence index. This flexible adjustment can effectively solve the problem of insufficient capital use efficiency caused by over-collateralization.

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2. Decentralized floating stablecoins not pegged to fiat currencies

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Crypto-Collateralized Stablecoins

MakerDao

MakerDao is a decentralized global reserve bank built on the Ethereum blockchain. It is one of the most widely used and longest-running projects running in the Ethereum DeFi ecosystem, and it is also TVL's largest DeFi project. The Maker protocol utilizes the Ethereum smart contract to mint the native decentralized stablecoin DAI through over-collateralization, which is pegged to the U.S. dollar 1:1.

Basic Mechanism

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Before MakerDao has been upgraded to the latest version, each minted DAI has a corresponding amount of ETH held in the MakerDao smart contract. These contracts are known as Collateralized Debt Positions (CDPs). Users can lock ETH in CDPs, and new DAI will be released to them in exchange for collateral in the future, where the value of ETH in CDP needs to be greater than the released DAI. In other words, the CDP must be overcollateralized. For example, if a user locks up $1,000 worth of ETH, the CDP contract will mint DAI worth less than $1,000, and the amount of released DAI will depend on the CDP's collateral-to-debt ratio. Users can borrow up to 66% of the collateral value in DAI, which is equivalent to a 150% mortgage rate. If the value of the collateral is lower than the predetermined range compared with the value of the released DAI tokens, the assets of the CDP will be liquidated by arbitrageurs to maintain the stability of the MakerDao system. In this way, the Maker Protocol ensures that there is enough collateral to back all DAI in circulation, and if a user wishes to withdraw the locked collateral, they must repay the DAI owed in the CDP, including the accrued stability fee associated with the debt ( Interest). To do this, users need to send the required DAI (not other cryptoassets) to the CDP to cover debt and stability fees."The smart contract and deposit assets to generate DAI, and the generated interest fee belongs to the Maker agreement. MakerDao currently accepts wBTC, LINK, Curve, and Uniswap LP tokens.

Governance Token “MKR”

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MKR has three functions:

As a governance token, MKR holders can use MKR to vote on the governance of MakerDao. The internal parameters that are usually voted by users include: Liquidation Ratio of collateral value and DAI generation/liquidation ratio, liquidation penalty amount ratio Liquidation Penalty, DSR deposit Interest rate DAI Savings Rate, auction mechanism parameters (filling amount, bidding time, filling interval, etc.), which encrypted assets can be used as collateral, and the selection of oracle nodes, etc.

MKR serves as a source of recapitalization for the Maker Protocol and is usually a last resort for borrowers. When there is a debt deficit in the Maker Protocol Buffer Pool (Maker Buffer), the system will issue additional MKR to obtain funds to repay debts. When the Maker Protocol Buffer Pool (Maker Buffer) funds exceed a certain amount (specified by MKR holders), the DAI will be auctioned Repurchase MKR and destroy it.

Stability Mechanism

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DAI is designed to be pegged to the U.S. dollar 1:1, but DAI will still be affected by market behavior and cause a certain price difference. MakerDao introduces the concept of DAI’s deposit rate (DAI Saving Rate), so that all users who hold DAI can automatically get Saving income to balance market supply and demand, you only need to deposit their DAI into the DSR contract of the Maker agreement. The DSR contract does not set a minimum deposit requirement for users. Users can withdraw some or all of their DAI from the DSR contract at any time.

When the market price of DAI deviates from the target price due to market changes, MKR holders can vote to change the DSR to maintain price stability.

1. If the market price of DAI exceeds one dollar, MKR holders can choose to gradually reduce the DSR to reduce demand, thereby reducing the market price of DAI to the target price of one dollar.

2. If the market price of DAI is lower than $1, MKR holders can choose to gradually increase DSR to stimulate demand, and then increase the market price of DAI to the target price of $1.

Peg Stability Module（PSM）

The interest of DAI is paid by the income of MakerDao's stability fee, so the comprehensive interest rate of the stability fee needs to be greater than that of DSR. If the income from the stability fee is not enough to cover the total expenditure of DAI’s DSR, the difference will be recorded as a bad debt, and additional MKR will be issued to make up the difference, and MKR holders will become risk bearers. If there is a surplus, it will be put into the Maker Buffer. To resist possible future risks and black swan events, but in essence, the stable currency price through the DSR contract can only achieve soft pegs.

When MakerDao introduced the Peg Stability Module (PSM), DAI has a more powerful stability mechanism. After that, PSM became the most important source of price stability.

PSM is a smart contract that allows users to easily arbitrage USDC (Circle), USDP (Paxos), and GUSD (Gemini) for DAI and vice versa. Swaps via PSM are always 1:1, that is, 1 DAI is always equal to 1 USDC.

It is true that MakerDao has sacrificed some decentralization to a certain extent by using the centralized stablecoin backed by fiat currency as an important mechanism for DAI to link to the US dollar. But after that, DAI also ushered in unprecedented development, and the value of USDC in the PSM reserve exceeded 5 billion US dollars. However, after OFAC announced sanctions against Tornado Cash, the seeds of hidden dangers buried in MakerDao's barbaric growth finally took root and began to counterattack the protocol, which also led the community to open the road to salvation for MetaDao.

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DAI liquidation mechanism

If a user wants to withdraw the Vault's collateral, the Vault owner must partially or fully repay the generated DAI and pay a stability fee that accumulates while the DAI is outstanding. The stability fee can only be paid in DAI, and after repaying the DAI and paying the stability fee, the Vault owner can return some or all of the collateral back to their wallets.

When the debt ratio (Collateral-to-Debt Ratio) is maintained in a healthy state, the system works normally. However, if the value of the collateral drops sharply and the DAI generated by the user is greater than the value that the Vault allows the collateral to generate DAI, the liquidation process will be triggered. At the time of liquidation, users no longer need to repay DAI, and the Maker agreement will take out the collateral in the liquidated Vault and sell it using a market-based auction mechanism in the agreement. This is called a Collateral Auction (Collateral Auction), and the successful bidder pays DAI to buy the collateral in the liquidated Vault at a discount. The DAI obtained through the collateral auction will be used to repay the debts in the Vault, including the liquidation penalty (Liquidation Penalty), which will flow to the Maker buffer, and MKR voters will set different liquidation penalties for different types of collateral .

If the DAI obtained from auctions and stability fees exceeds the upper limit of the Maker buffer (a value set by MKR governance), the excess will be sold through a surplus auction (Surplus Auction). During the surplus auction, bidders use MKR to bid for a fixed amount of DAI, and the highest bidder wins. Once the surplus auction is over, the Maker Protocol will automatically destroy the MKR obtained from the auction, thereby reducing the total supply of MKR.

Challenges

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Over-collateralization of the pegged dollar inhibits the efficiency of capital use

At present, no stablecoin can escape Trilemma: Peg Stability, Decentralization, Capital Efficiency. The Maker protocol requires collateral worth more than $1 to create a collateralized debt position (Maker Vault) to mint one DAI. In other words, sacrificing capital utilization efficiency to improve stability, the minting of DAI means that collateral exceeding the value of minted DAI cannot be circulated in smart contracts.

It can be seen from the above figure that the entire ecosystem of MakerDao is extremely dependent on USDC, which means that 43.6% of the minted decentralized stable currency DAI comes from USDC mortgages in Vaults. The U.S. Treasury Department’s sanctions on Tornado Cash are enough to make us think about whether the entire DeFi ecosystem is decentralized and censorship-resistant. Although the MakerDao community once proposed to clean up the USDC position and replace it with other native cryptocurrencies. But DAI and MKR are able to support such a high market value of USDC. Therefore, if DAI wants to achieve true decentralization, it must weigh the scale effect brought by USDC and completely remove USDC’s consideration of the sharp drop in DAI’s market value.

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Governance Reform: MetaDAO

On the one hand, the existing governance process is too complicated, which restricts the speed of MakerDao's development of new functions; on the other hand, it needs to rely on huge human participation. As an important part of the Endgame Plan, MetaDAO is committed to speeding up the governance process, reducing MakerDao's labor costs, isolating risks, and modularizing the previously highly complex governance process.

Through the idea of ​​modularization, the complex MakerDao governance is split into small pieces, that is, MetaDAOs one by one. Each MetaDAO can focus on its own tasks without being distracted by other responsibilities. For example, MetaDAO, which focuses on creation, will recruit developers to build front-end products and on-chain functions; MetaDAO, which focuses on RWA (real world assets), will be responsible for managing RWA Vaults. This can also overcome the single-threaded problem of the current Maker governance process, realize multi-center governance, allow MetaDAO to execute in parallel, and speed up the governance process.

MetaDAOs that are independent of each other have their own governance tokens and governance processes, and each MetaDAO needs to earn its own income. According to the statement of the final plan, it will have a total of 2 billion MDAO tokens distributed in the form of Yield Farming. Half of them will be distributed in the first two years, and the reward will be halved every two years thereafter. Yield Farming is divided into three categories: 20% is allocated to DAI Farming to incentivize the demand for DAI, 40% is allocated to ETHDFarming to incentivize the use of Staked ETH to generate DAI, and 40% is allocated to MKRFarming to incentivize active voting governance.

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The path to decentralization

MakerDao mainly increases the degree of decentralization through the following paths, mainly focusing on increasing the use of decentralized collateral and using protocol income to accumulate decentralized assets owned by the protocol.

1. Increase the use of ETH collateral

After Tornado Cash was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury Department, Maker has adopted a series of measures to reduce its dependence on USDC.

For example, increase the debt ceiling of WSTETH-B Vault and reduce the stability fee to zero, and reduce the stability fee of ETH-A, ETH-B, WSTETH-A, WBTC-A, WBTC-B, RENBTC-A and other Vaults.

The starting point of this series of measures is to reduce the funding rate of other Vaults to minimize the need to mint DAI with USDC through PSM, but in fact the effect is limited, because the hard peg mechanism of PSM is largely to facilitate users to conduct stablecoins. arbitrage between.

2. Introduce ETHD

ETHD was introduced to own staked ETH under the control of Maker governance. ETHD is a wrapper around Staked ETH (similar to wstETH). Users can wrap Staked ETH into ETHD, or redeem ETHD into Staked ETH.

In short, ETHD is a new synthetic asset generated through "Staked ETH", which helps Maker to obtain more "Staked ETH". Only by accumulating Staked ETH collateral as much as possible can decentralization be ensured status. Afterwards, 90% of the protocol revenue surplus will be used to purchase ETHD and deposited in the Protocol Controlled Vault.

3. Adjust the use of real world assets (RWA)

The endgame plan proposes 3 different collateral strategies, which are the dove phase, the eagle phase, and the nirvana phase, which will gradually develop forward with the timeline and gradually advance according to the threat of regulation.

The first is called the Pigeon Stance, which is basically Maker’s current state. During this phase (scheduled to last two and a half years), Maker's main task is to increase RWA to focus on earning income and storing ETH for the next phase, during which DAI will not be de-pegged to one dollar.

Finally, the "Nirvana Stage" (Phoenix Stance), DAI no longer allows any RWA, except RWA that is physically resilient (not easily confiscated by regulators).

Liquity USD

Liquity is a decentralized, non-custodial, and governance-free lending protocol that allows users to take out interest-free loans using ETH as the sole collateral. The loan is paid in LUSD (a stable currency pegged to the US dollar) and needs to maintain 110% minimum mortgage rate. At any time, it can be redeemed against the underlying collateral at par.

LQTY

LQTY is a project token issued by Liquity. It is used to capture the fee income generated by the system and to incentivize early users and front-end page developers.

Trove

Trove is where users take out and maintain loans, similar to Vaults or CDPs on other platforms. Troves will maintain two balances: one is the asset (ETH) as collateral, and the other is the debt denominated in LUSD. Users can change their respective amounts by adding collateral or repaying debt. As these balances change, Trove's collateral ratios change accordingly, and users can close out the associated Trove at any time by paying off their debt in full.

Basic Mechanism

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Liquity has always been regarded as the strongest competitor of MakerDao, and they have many similarities with each other. For example, the lending model uses an asset as collateral as a credit guarantee to generate a stable currency anchored to the US dollar. However, Liquity In fact, there are many mechanisms designed specifically for the pain points of MakerDao.

First of all, the core advantage of Liquity over MakerDao or any other DeFi lending agreement is that it only has a minimum mortgage ratio of 110%, which means that more liquidity can be released under the same amount of ETH, providing higher capital utilization efficiency and leverage multiples.

Another point that makes Liquity more attractive is the interest-free loan. Liquity only charges a one-time loan fee, and does not need to continue to charge stable loan fees like MakerDAO. The difference in fee structure makes Liquity more cost-effective in terms of long-term loans .

Liquity believes in the spirit of complete decentralization, and believes that only LUSD minted with ETH as collateral is a truly decentralized stablecoin. In fact, MakerDao only supported ETH as collateral before March 2020, but the sharp drop in the price of ETH after 312 accelerated the launch of MakerDao's multi-collateral support, and opened the USDC 1: 1 exchange channel for DAI restore its mobility. We also talked about the later story above. The "improvement" of Maker promoted the great development of DAI in the bull market, but it also planted the seeds for the hidden danger of its centralization.

Liquity has no governance voting, all operations are done automatically by the algorithm, and the protocol parameters are set when the contract is deployed. Governance plays a big role in MakerDAO because protocol parameters such as debt ceiling and minimum collateralization ratio are all determined by voting.

The liquidation mechanism is the core of the stability of any lending system. There are obvious differences between the liquidation mechanisms of MakerDao and Liquity.

Liquity can stand out among many decentralized stablecoins because it experienced the 3.12 incident shortly after its mainnet was launched. LUSD performed well during this period, in stark contrast to MakerDao. The root cause lies in Liquity's efficient liquidation mechanism. Liquity has innovated an automated liquidation mechanism that reduces the risk of MakerDao's liquidation mechanism.

Liquidation Mechanism

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1. Stable Pool Mechanism

The Stability Pool is the first line of defense in maintaining the solvency of the system. It serves as a source of liquidity to repay debts liquidated on Trove, ensuring that the total supply of LUSD is always backed by collateral. The funds of the stable pool come from users who pledge LUSD. Although they lose a certain amount of liquidity, they will receive LQTY tokens as incentives. On the other hand, when any Trove in the Stable Pool is liquidated, the LUSD corresponding to the remaining debt of the Trove will be burned from the balance of the Stable Pool to pay off its debt. In exchange, the entire collateral of this Trove is transferred to the stability pool. In other words, users who pledge LUSD can obtain a certain amount of ETH rewards from system liquidation, and the amount is related to the ratio of the user's pledged LUSD to the total amount of LUSD in the pool. However, since Troves are likely to be liquidated at a collateral ratio of just under 110%, stable pool providers will receive more of the dollar value of their collateral relative to their debt repayments, which is also very attractive to some users After minting LUSD, it is not used in other transactions or DeFi protocols, but is directly pledged in the stable pool.

2. Redistribution mechanism

If the stable pool does not have enough liquidity (when LUSD is exhausted), the second line of defense is activated, that is, the redistribution mechanism. The redistribution mechanism can redistribute the remaining debt from liquidated positions to all existing positions. In this case, the high-collateralization position will take on more debt and receive more collateral from the liquidated assets than the low-collateralization position. To provide this additional layer of security to the system, these higher collateral positions are rewarded as liquidators, essentially getting liquidated base collateral.

The third line of defense focuses on addressing systemic risks. Liquity introduces a recovery mode. This mode will be triggered if the overall collateralization ratio of the protocol drops below 150%. In doing so, the system will try to offset positions with the stable pool that have the lowest collateralization ratio (even if it is higher than 110%). Additionally, the system blocks borrower transactions that would further reduce the overall mortgage rate. New LUSD can only be issued by adjusting existing Troves to increase their collateralization ratio, or by opening a new Trove with a collateralization ratio >= 150%. Generally, if an adjustment to an existing Trove reduces its collateralization ratio, the transaction will only be executed if the resulting overall collateralization ratio is above 150%.

Stability Mechanism

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hard hook mechanism

One of Liquity's core innovations is that its native stablecoin is redeemable against the underlying collateral held by borrowers. This means that every holder of LUSD can exchange their LUSD for ETH at face value, that is, use 100 LUSD to get 100 USD worth of ETH. When the redemption occurs, the system will use LUSD to repay the Trove with the lowest mortgage rate at present, and transfer the corresponding amount of ETH from the affected Trove to the redeemer.

The system charges a one-time fee for each redemption, called a redemption fee. This fee starts at 0%, increases with each redemption, and decays to 0% if no redemption occurs for a period of time. This fee ensures that redemptions are not made more often than necessary from a price stability standpoint.

Due to the existence of the redemption mechanism, speculators can immediately obtain arbitrage income as long as the value of the redeemed ETH is higher than the current value of the redeemed LUSD. This ensures that LUSD will never fall below one dollar in the vast majority of cases.

Soft hook mechanism

A LUSD price above $1 makes borrowing more attractive (since repayments can be expected at $1 or less), while a price below $1 incentivizes repayment of existing debt. When more LUSD is borrowed than repaid, the total supply of LUSD will grow, which should depreciate LUSD against the U.S. dollar. Conversely, if the repayments are higher than the new debt, the money supply will shrink and LUSD will appreciate.

But in reality, LUSD is often higher than 1 dollar, indicating that the soft peg does not actually play a sufficient role.

Challenges

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The status quo of LUSD is similar to DAI in the early stage. It has good decentralization characteristics, but the circulation is not large enough. At the same time, since a large amount of LUSD is required to prevent liquidation, the exchange rate of LUSD has always been higher than one dollar when the market fluctuates, which is a fundamental problem for stablecoins. Back then, DAI solved the above two problems in one fell swoop by introducing PSM and allowing the free exchange of USDC and DAI. DAI achieved unprecedented development, but it also brought corresponding challenges of anti-censorship and centralization. We will wait and see what next solution the LUSD team will bring us.

crvUSD

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crvUSD adopts a smoother liquidation algorithm LLAMMA, which effectively solves the risk of death spiral caused by insufficient liquidity in the centralized liquidation of the original over-collateralized stablecoin. Currently, crvUSD only supports ETH as the only collateral, and gets rid of the supervision of USDC risk.

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Liquidation Automated Market Making Algorithm (LLAMMA)

crvUSD is still issued through over-collateralization. Simply put, when ETH is used to mint crvUSD, the deposited ETH and generated crvUSD are automatically combined into LPs. These LPs are linked to its proprietary Curve AMM pool to replace the traditional lending and liquidation process. The characteristic is that when the liquidation threshold is reached, the liquidation does not happen once, but a continuous liquidation/de-liquidation process, which is detailed below.

In the figure below, Pamm represents the price of the function curve, and Pcenter is the price of the external oracle. For example, borrow crvUSD with ETH as collateral. When the value of ETH is high enough (yellow area), the collateral will not change, just like the traditional mortgage lending model. When the price of ETH fell and entered the liquidation range (white area), ETH began to be gradually sold as it fell. After falling below the range (reaching the green zone), all of them are stable coins, and there will be no change if they continue to fall, which is the same as other lending agreements. However, in the middle liquidation interval, if ETH rises, Curve will use stablecoins to help users buy ETH again. If it fluctuates in the middle liquidation range, the process of liquidation and de-liquidation will be repeated continuously, and ETH will be sold and bought continuously.

This process is similar to hedging impermanent losses after traditional AMMs provide liquidity, such as providing ETH/USDC liquidity on Uniswap. When ETH rises, ETH is passively sold. To prevent drastic changes in currency-based funds during the process of providing liquidity, you can only buy ETH in the market; similarly, when ETH falls, sell ETH for hedging.

Therefore, in the LLAMA liquidation mechanism, we can simply understand it as Uniswap V3, which provides liquidity in the opposite direction. When the price of ETH falls within the set price range, it will gradually sell ETH and buy USD. And vice versa, above the upper limit of the price range, all collateral is ETH, and below the lower limit, all collateral is USD.

Therefore, this algorithm can indeed reduce the loss of users who are liquidated in extreme market conditions, and even control the loss to a very low range after the price rebounds.

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PegKeeper and monetary policy

With sufficient collateral support, the price of crvUSD can be anchored at $1. But the price in the secondary market is always fluctuating. At this time, PegKeeper will play a role, which is similar to the existence of the central bank.

When the price of crvUSD is above the anchor price (ps>1) due to the increase in demand, that is, when it is higher than $1, PegKeeper can mint crvUSD without collateral and deposit it in the stable currency exchange pool unilaterally, making crvUSD price drop. Even if there is no collateral in the minting process, the liquidity in the liquidity pool can provide implicit collateral support.

When the price of crvUSD falls below $1, PegKeeper can withdraw part of the liquidity of crvUSD to restore the price to $1.

In this process, PegKeeper is tantamount to selling crvUSD when the price is higher than $1, buying crvUSD when it is lower than $1, and maintaining the price stability of crvUSD through arbitrage.

Monetary policy controls the relationship between PegKeeper's debt and crvUSD supply. For example, when debt/supply is greater than 5%, parameters could be changed to incentivize borrowers to borrow and sell stablecoins and force the system to burn debt. When debt/supply is low, borrowers are incentivized to repay loans, causing the system to increase debt.

Curve's layout on stablecoins is of strategic significance. The stablecoins generated by the pledge of encrypted native assets, including ETH, can gradually get rid of the stablecoins that rely on fiat currency as the endorsement, enhance the anti-regulatory ability of the encrypted market, and more importantly, provide The DeFi ecosystem provides self-healing, and we will wait and see how crvUSD will perform in the downward bull market.

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