复盘美伊迷局四大正确预测案例:公开信息中的端倪
- Core Thesis: By analyzing four typical trading accounts on Polymarket within the US-Iran conflict prediction market, this article reveals how systematic betting on "de-escalation," "continued stalemate," or "low-probability events" can yield high returns during periods of high geopolitical uncertainty. The underlying logic is that market sentiment often overestimates the probability of major, short-term changes.
- Key Elements:
- Case 1: All-in on ceasefire, achieving a single-day return of 3,503%. An account bought the "Ceasefire by April 7" contract at an average price of 2.8 cents. By gambling on extreme odds, it profited $450,000 upon the ceasefire announcement, exemplifying "directional betting" and the strategy of "covering low-probability events in bulk."
- Case 2: After consecutive losses, a full win yielding $510,000. Before the war broke out, an account placed 21 consecutive bets on "US will attack Iran," losing $39,000. It finally hit the target on the day of the airstrike on February 28, achieving a single-day return of 684%. Its strategy was based on a strong conviction that the geopolitical event would "eventually occur," executed through "full-time-window coverage."
- Case 3: Large capital betting on "nothing will happen," profiting $147,000. An account deployed $2.1 million to systematically purchase the "No" option on all major contracts, betting that events like "permanent peace" were impossible to achieve in the short term. This captured the "premium" generated by market optimism, with the core strategy being arbitrage using "insufficient time."
- Case 4: High-frequency trading shorting market panic, earning $292,000. Through 2,000 trades, an account consistently identified overvalued "Yes" contracts driven by panic and shorted them. It capitalized on the pattern where "gradual stalemate" is undervalued and "major changes" are overvalued in geopolitical markets, achieving stable profits.
- Common Insight: The core logic behind all successful accounts was not predicting specific dates or events, but exploiting market sentiment biases. In low-liquidity contracts, market pricing systematically underestimates the probability of sudden geopolitical turns (e.g., a ceasefire) or overestimates the probability of short-term upheaval (e.g., regime collapse).
Original by Odaily (@OdailyChina)
Author: jk
On February 28, 2026, the joint US-Israel airstrike on Iran began. This was less than two hours after Trump posted an 8-minute video on Truth Social, and Tehran had yet to officially confirm Khamenei's death.
But on Polymarket, the contract "Will the US strike Iran before February 2026?" had already traded at $0.98.
From February 28 to April 30, Polymarket contracts surrounding the US-Iran conflict generated over $300 million in trading volume. During this period, the market experienced multiple high-volatility nodes: the outbreak of war, the blockade of Hormuz, ceasefire announcements, ceasefire breakdowns, and ceasefire extensions. Each major event was accompanied by sharp repricing of contract prices.
In this article, Odaily breaks down four accounts that profited significantly during this period. The core question is single: What was the public information environment when they placed their bets, and was their judgment justifiable at the time?
Case 1: All-in on Ceasefire, 3,503% in a Single Day, Profiting Over $450,000
Account: Fernandoinfante
On April 7, Trump announced a US-Iran ceasefire on Truth Social. The "Will the US and Iran ceasefire before April 7?" contract jumped from single digits to nearly $1. The beneficiary of this trade was Fernandoinfante, who had previously bought 477,543 Yes contracts at an average price of 2.8 cents, for a total cost of $13,200.
Single trade return: 3,503%, cashed out that day, profit of $450,000, roughly equivalent to over 3 million RMB.
Before April 7, public information on ceasefire negotiations was as follows: On April 5, Pakistan proposed a two-week ceasefire draft, which Iran formally rejected, countering with a 10-point plan including conditions like troop withdrawal, compensation, and full lifting of sanctions. On April 6, Trump threatened to expand strikes to power grids and bridges but then delayed by 5 days, stating "negotiations are ongoing." In the early hours of April 7, the market's consensus price for a ceasefire was still extremely low. 2.8¢ implied the market saw less than a 3% chance of a ceasefire being reached that day.
From the perspective of public information, Iran had just rejected Pakistan's draft, Trump was still threatening bombing, there were no official negotiation channels, and Hormuz remained blockaded. No mainstream media reported an imminent ceasefire on the night of April 6.
What was the basis for this judgment?
First, information asymmetry. Polysights pointed out on Twitter that this bet was placed two days before the ceasefire announcement. If true, the buy-in time was around April 5, when Trump had already begun softening his rhetoric (delaying power grid strikes by 5 days), and the Pakistani mediation channel remained open. Some Washington observers had started discussing "Trump needs a result" on April 5-6. A trader consistently tracking negotiation channels might have been faster than market pricing in reacting to Pakistan's diplomatic moves, but this still requires extremely strong information-gathering ability or insider channels.
Second, extreme odds gambling. A price of 2.8¢ means even if the ceasefire probability was only 10%, this was still a positive expected value bet. The trader's strategy: in the tail-end phase of geopolitical contracts, systematically buy all low-priced Yes contracts, covering multiple deadlines with small principal, waiting for one to trigger.
Fernandoinfante also had other losing trades – predicting the Strait of Hormuz would return to normal, a permanent peace deal would be reached, and the Iranian regime would collapse – all of which failed, confirming this logic. He bet on multiple directions simultaneously; the ceasefire was just one that happened to hit.
Of course, his own explanation was "Jesus told him."

He claimed to have received divine revelation
So, what can be learned?
This person wasn't betting on a specific outcome, but on the broader direction of "conflict de-escalation in some way." He bought contracts on ceasefire, permanent peace, Hormuz restoration, and regime collapse, executing a diversified directional bet.
Ultimately, only the ceasefire event paid out; all others lost. But a single 3,500% return was enough to cover all losses and generate hundreds of thousands of dollars in net profit.
The logic of this structure is that in low-liquidity tail contracts, the market systematically undervalues the probability of sudden geopolitical turning points. When an event's probability is priced at 2-3%, but the actual probability might be 10-15%, buying such contracts in bulk is rational on an expected value basis, even if most will expire worthless.
Case 2: Consecutive Losses, Then Hit the Jackpot: The "Steadfast Conviction" Strategy
Account: Vivaldi007
Vivaldi007 registered on Polymarket in February 2026, less than three weeks before the geopolitical conflict erupted. From day one of registration, he did only one thing: bet that the US would strike Iran.
His trading record is quite remarkable: Starting on February 11, for every deadline – 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 20th, 22nd, 25th, 26th – he bought Yes contracts one by one, with average prices between 0.4¢ and 3.6¢. Each one expired worthless, all losses, totaling approximately $39,000.

Persistent strategy despite repeated failures
Then on February 28, the joint US-Israel airstrike began, and Khamenei was killed that day.
He held 504,416 Yes contracts on the February 28 deadline, with an average price of 12.7¢, investing $63,986. He ultimately profited $437,930, a return of 684%. Combined with two other contracts settled the same day – "Will Khamenei step down?" (bought at 53¢, +88%) and "Will Israel strike Iran?" (bought at 14.9¢, +571%) – the three contracts together netted over $629,000, covering all previous losses and earning a clean profit of $511,098.
Timeline Position and the Information Environment at the Time
When Vivaldi007 registered his account in early February, several important events were occurring in the public information sphere:
On February 6, indirect US-Iran negotiations restarted in Muscat. Witkoff, Kushner, and CENTCOM commander Brad Cooper appeared on the US delegation list – the direct involvement of the military in negotiations was an anomalous signal itself. On February 13, Trump ordered the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group to the Middle East. On February 17, Khamenei publicly stated "the US Navy can be sunk." On February 20, Trump gave a 10-day ultimatum, publicly threatening military action. On February 24, in his State of the Union address, Trump claimed Iran had restarted its nuclear program. On February 26, the third round of Geneva talks collapsed, with the US delegation "leaving in disappointment." On February 27, multiple embassies began evacuating non-essential personnel from Tehran.
Of course, the Trump administration had the precedent of Venezuela, which was also an indispensable part of the consideration.
From February 11 to February 27, the market's pricing for "Will the US strike Iran in February?" never exceeded 15¢. The cost of buying all these deadlines was extremely low because the market broadly leaned towards negotiations continuing.
The Logic of this Strategy
Vivaldi007's operation didn't predict a specific date but laid bets across all deadlines within a time window, covering as many dates as possible with very low unit costs, waiting for one to trigger.
This strategy has several structural prerequisites: First, he had a strong conviction on the direction that "the US will ultimately strike," otherwise he wouldn't have persisted from early February to the end of the month. Second, he accepted sustained losses, totaling $39,000. Third, his position on the February 28 contract was significantly larger than on other dates ($63,986 vs. $250-$11,000 per trade on other dates), indicating that he increased his bet on this specific date at some point rather than distributing it evenly.
Case 3: Betting $2.1 Million on "Nothing Will Happen": The Capital-Safe Strategy
Account: AdrianCronauer
The logic of this account's operations is completely different from the first two cases. Fernandoinfante and Vivaldi007 bet on "something happening"; AdrianCronauer bet on "nothing happening."
He uniformly bet No on all major Iran-related contracts before late April: a permanent peace deal would not be reached, Trump would not declare an end to military operations, Iran would not surrender enriched uranium, the Hormuz blockade would not be officially lifted by the US, and diplomatic meetings would not occur before the deadline. Every bet was No, and every one won.
Returns were not very high compared to the first two; the highest was only 8.45%, the lowest 0.44%. But the principal scale compensated for everything. Just the bet on "Permanent peace deal reached before April 30" involved a stake of $630,305 for a profit of $53,257. "Trump ends military operations before April 30" involved $529,058 for a profit of $10,568. Across 38 predictions with a 79% win rate, deploying over $2.1 million in principal, he cumulatively netted $147,464.
Timeline Position and Information Environment
The buy-in point for these trades was concentrated between early and mid-April, after the ceasefire announcement but before the negotiations broke down.
When the ceasefire was announced on April 7, the market's pricing for "Permanent peace deal" and "End military operations" briefly rose. AdrianCronauer's No positions were partly established during this window: when the market became optimistic due to the ceasefire news, pushing the Yes price for "Permanent peace deal reached before April 30" to 7-8¢, he bought No at 92¢, locking in the counterparty's optimism premium.
On April 11-12, negotiations in Pakistan lasted 21 hours and ended with "no agreement." JD Vance publicly stated Iran "refused to accept our terms." On April 13, the US announced a counter-blockade of Iranian ports. On April 17, Iran announced the re-opening of Hormuz, only to close it again on April 18. By the time Trump extended the ceasefire on April 21, only 9 days remained until the April 30 deadline, and negotiations were effectively deadlocked.
Against this information backdrop, even at 7-8¢, the pricing for "Permanent peace deal reached before April 30" and "Trump ends military operations before April 30" was, in AdrianCronauer's view, overvalued.

The Core Judgment of this Strategy
AdrianCronauer's operation was based on a relatively simple but continuously validated judgment: In highly uncertain geopolitical stalemates, major breakthroughs within short-term deadlines are always overestimated by the market.
He wasn't betting on specific negotiation outcomes, but on "insufficient time." Events like permanent peace agreements, declarations ending military operations, and transfers of enriched uranium – even if they eventually happen – are extremely unlikely to be completed within a few weeks. When the market prices Yes for such contracts at 1-8¢, the corresponding No is at 92-99¢, yielding only 1-8%, but with extremely low risk. He uses scale to amplify returns, spreading $2.1 million across over a dozen related contracts to systematically harvest the market's optimism premium.
What's the Risk?
This approach's fatal weakness is a single-event black swan. If Trump had actually declared an end to military operations before April 30, his $529,058 No position would have gone to zero. He bought No at 97¢, meaning he believed the probability of this event was less than 3%. And Trump's decisions have historically been unpredictable.
However, considering the entire April information environment, this judgment was supported: talks had broken down, bilateral trust was extremely low, Iran's internal leadership was divided, and Hormuz alternated between open and closed. Any one of these conditions made the probability of a "formal agreement within 30 days" minuscule.
Case 4: How to Achieve Case 3's Effect with Small Capital? The High-Frequency Trading Strategy
Account: 0xcd7..0d127
This account has no single-trade huge profit story. 2,000 trades, $25.9M total volume, $7,900 average position, 75.5% win rate, cumulative profit of $292,000.
The PnL curve starts in June 2025, climbing slowly, steadily, almost linearly to the top right, with no obvious jumps or significant drawdowns.
The Strategy's Essence: Systematically Shorting Market Panic
Analyst Jay Godiyadada on X described this account perfectly:
The historical success rate of the Iranian regime in withstanding external shocks is about 95%, but during panic, the market prices "Regime collapse" Yes at around 20%, causing the corresponding No to be undervalued by 15-20¢. Whenever the market pushes up the Yes price due to an event (outbreak of war, leader killed, ceasefire breakdown), this account buys No with a large position, harvesting that excess panic pricing; then, as the situation stabilizes, it takes profits.
Take "Will the Iranian regime collapse before June 30?" For example. At the start of the war, when the situation was most chaotic and uncertain, the No price was suppressed to around 91¢, the market's implied regime collapse probability was nearly 10%. He bought at this point. As the ceasefire materialized and the situation stabilized, the market reassessed the probability of regime collapse. The No price climbed from 91¢ to 95¢, meaning the position had achieved a 4% floating profit.
In summary, this account was essentially swinging in the prediction market.
Difference Between This Account and Case 3
While their strategies seem similar on the surface, they have one key difference: AdrianCronauer is concentrated capital, low frequency, large positions – single trades of $500,000-$630,000, a few contracts, total trades 29. 0xcd7 is dispersed capital, high frequency, medium-sized positions – average $7,900, 2,000 trades, spanning multiple market categories (Iran, Greenland, Fed Chair), operating continuously for nearly a year.
AdrianCronauer's approach is closer to single-shot arbitrage. 0xcd7 is closer to market-making logic: continuously identifying emotion-driven, overvalued Yes contracts, systematically shorting them, and accumulating returns through frequency and win rate.
$25.9M volume, $7,900 average position, 2,000 trades
This means this account maintained a very high turnover rate for most of the time. This style is very Meme-like: the trader doesn't wait for settlement, but continuously scans the market and intervenes when finding pricing deviations with a 5-10% profit margin. A 75.5% win rate over 2,000 samples is statistically significant and unlikely to be luck.
This account's core competency, in Jay's words, is a "status quo bias" – a systematic bet on "the current state will continue." In geopolitical markets, major changes are always overestimated, and gradual stalemates are always underestimated.
Knowing this, and having enough capital and discipline to execute consistently, is sufficient.


