复盘美伊迷局四大正确预测案例：公开信息中的端倪

Original: Odaily Planet Daily (@OdailyChina)

Author: jk

On February 28, 2026, the joint US-Israel airstrike on Iran had begun. This was less than two hours after Trump posted an 8-minute video on Truth Social, and Khamenei's death had not yet been officially confirmed by Tehran.

But on Polymarket, the contract "Will the US strike Iran before February 2026?" was already trading at $0.98.

From February 28 to April 30, Polymarket contracts surrounding the US-Iran conflict generated over $300 million in trading volume. During this period, the market experienced multiple high-volatility nodes: the start of the war, the blockade of Hormuz, the ceasefire announcement, the breakdown of the ceasefire, and the extension of the ceasefire. Each major event was accompanied by a dramatic repricing of contract prices.

In this article, Odaily Planet Daily deconstructs four accounts that profited significantly during this period, focusing on one core question: What was the public information environment when they placed their bets, and was their judgment supportable at the time?

Case 1: All-in on Ceasefire, 3,503% in a Single Day, Profit Over $450,000

Account: Fernandoinfante

On April 7, Trump announced a US-Iran ceasefire on Truth Social. The contract "Will there be a US-Iran ceasefire before April 7?" jumped from single digits to nearly $1. The beneficiary of this trade was Fernandoinfante, who had previously bought 477,543 Yes contracts at an average price of 2.8 cents, for a total cost of $13,200.

A single trade returned 3,503%, settled the same day, yielding a profit of $450,000, equivalent to over 3 million RMB.

Before April 7, the public information on ceasefire negotiations was as follows: On April 5, Pakistan proposed a two-week ceasefire draft, which Iran formally rejected and countered with a 10-point plan including demands for troop withdrawal, reparations, and full lifting of sanctions. On April 6, Trump threatened to expand strikes to power grids and bridges but then delayed by 5 days, stating "negotiations are ongoing." In the early hours of April 7, the market's consensus pricing for a ceasefire was still extremely low. 2.8¢ meant the market believed the probability of a ceasefire that day was less than 3%.

From a public information standpoint, Iran had just rejected the Pakistan draft, Trump was still threatening bombing, there were no official negotiation channels, and Hormuz remained blockaded. No mainstream media reported an imminent ceasefire on the evening of April 6.

What was the basis for this judgment?

First, information asymmetry. Polysights pointed out on Twitter that this bet was placed two days before the ceasefire announcement. If true, the purchase time was around April 5. At that time, Trump had begun to soften his rhetoric (delaying the power grid strike by 5 days), the Pakistani mediation channel was still open, and some Washington observers had already started discussing "Trump needing a result" on April 5–6. A trader consistently tracking negotiation channels could have been faster than market pricing on Pakistani diplomatic moves, but this still requires strong information gathering capabilities or insider access.

Second, extreme odds betting. A price of 2.8¢ means that even if the probability of a ceasefire was only 10%, it was still a bet with a positive expected value. The trader's strategy was to systematically buy all low-priced Yes contracts in the final stages of a geopolitical contract, covering multiple expiration dates with small capital, waiting for one to trigger.

Fernandoinfante also had other losing trades, such as predicting the Strait of Hormuz would return to normal, a permanent peace agreement would be reached, and the Iranian regime would collapse (all of which failed), supporting this logic. He bet on multiple directions simultaneously; the ceasefire was just one that happened to hit.

Of course, his own explanation was "Jesus told him."

He claims to have received divine inspiration

So, what can be learned?

This person wasn't betting on a specific outcome, but on the general direction of "the conflict de-escalating in some way." He bought contracts on ceasefire, permanent peace, Hormuz reopening, and regime collapse, executing a directional bet in a diversified manner.

In the end, only the ceasefire contract paid off; the rest were losses. But a single 3,500% return was enough to cover all losses and generate hundreds of thousands of dollars in net profit.

The logic of this structure is that in low-liquidity tail-risk contracts, the market systematically underestimates the probability of sudden geopolitical turns. When the probability of an event is priced at 2-3%, but the actual probability might be 10-15%, buying a batch of such contracts in bulk is rational in terms of expected value, even if most will expire worthless.

Case 2: Consecutive Losses, Then All Hit on the Last Day: The "Firm Conviction" Strategy

Account: Vivaldi007

Vivaldi007 registered on Polymarket in February 2026, less than three weeks before the geopolitical conflict erupted. From day one, he did only one thing: bet that the US would attack Iran.

His trading history is quite remarkable: Starting from February 11, for every single expiration date – 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, 20th, 22nd, 25th, 26th – he bought Yes contracts one by one, at average prices between 0.4¢ and 3.6¢. Each one expired worthless, all losses, totaling approximately $39,000.

A strategy of repeated failures and persistence

Then, on February 28, the joint US-Israel airstrike began, and Khamenei was killed that day.

He held 504,416 Yes contracts on the contract expiring February 28, at an average price of 12.7¢, investing $63,986. He eventually profited $437,930, a return of 684%. Combined with the same day's contracts "Will Khamenei step down?" (bought at 53¢, +88%) and "Will Israel strike Iran?" (bought at 14.9¢, +571%), the three contracts netted over $629,000 in a single day, covering all previous losses and netting a profit of $511,098.

Timeline Context and the Information Environment at the Time

In early February, when Vivaldi007 registered his account, several significant events occurred in the public information sphere:

On February 6, indirect US-Iran negotiations resumed in Muscat. Witkoff, Kushner, and CENTCOM Commander Brad Cooper were on the US delegation list – military involvement in negotiations was itself an abnormal signal. On February 13, Trump ordered the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group to head to the Middle East. On February 17, Khamenei publicly stated "the US Navy can be sunk." On February 20, Trump issued a 10-day ultimatum and publicly threatened military action. On February 24, in the State of the Union address, Trump claimed Iran had restarted its nuclear program. On February 26, the third round of Geneva talks collapsed, with the US delegation leaving "in disappointment." On February 27, multiple embassies began evacuating non-essential personnel from Tehran.

Of course, the precedent of Venezuela under the Trump administration was also an indispensable part of the consideration.

From February 11 to February 27, the market's pricing for "Will the US strike Iran in February?" never exceeded 15¢. Buying all these expiration dates was extremely cheap because the market generally still leaned towards negotiations continuing.

The Logic of this Strategy

Vivaldi007's operation didn't predict a specific date but laid bets across all expiration dates within a time window, covering as many dates as possible with very low unit costs, waiting for one to trigger.

This strategy has several structural prerequisites: First, he had a strong conviction that "the US will eventually strike," otherwise he wouldn't have kept betting from early February to the end of the month. Second, he accepted sustained losses, up to $39,000. Third, his position on the February 28 contract was significantly larger than on other dates ($63,986 vs. $250–$11,000 for other dates), indicating he increased his bet on that specific date at some point, rather than allocating evenly.

Case 3: $2.1 Million Bet on "Nothing Will Happen": The Capital-Seeking Stability Strategy

Account: AdrianCronauer

The operating logic of this account is completely different from the first two cases. Fernandoinfante and Vivaldi007 bet on "something will happen," while AdrianCronauer bet on "nothing will happen."

He uniformly bet No on all major Iran-related contracts before the end of April: a permanent peace agreement won't be reached, Trump won't declare an end to military operations, Iran won't surrender enriched uranium, the Hormuz blockade won't be officially lifted by the US, a diplomatic conference won't be held before the deadline. Every bet was No, and every one won.

Compared to the first two cases, the returns weren't exceptionally high; the highest was only 8.45%, the lowest 0.44%. But the principal size made up for it. Just the single bet "Will a permanent peace agreement be reached before April 30?" involved a stake of $630,305 for a profit of $53,257. "Will Trump stop military operations before April 30?" involved a stake of $529,058 for a profit of $10,568. Across 38 predictions, with a 79% win rate, he deployed over $2.1 million in capital, accumulating a net profit of $147,464.

Timeline Context and Information Environment

The purchases for these trades were concentrated from early April to mid-April, specifically after the ceasefire announcement but before the negotiations broke down.

When the ceasefire was announced on April 7, the market pricing for "permanent peace agreement" and "end of military operations" temporarily rose. AdrianCronauer's No positions were partly established during this window: When the market became optimistic due to the ceasefire news, pushing the Yes price for "permanent peace agreement before April 30" to 7-8¢, he bought No at 92¢, locking in the counterparty's optimistic premium.

On April 11–12, negotiations in Pakistan lasted 21 hours and ended with "no agreement." JD Vance publicly stated that Iran "refused to accept our terms." On April 13, the US announced a counter-blockade of Iranian ports. On April 17, Iran announced the reopening of Hormuz, only to close it again on April 18. By the time Trump extended the ceasefire on April 21, there were only 9 days left until the April 30 deadline, and negotiations had effectively reached a stalemate.

Against this informational backdrop, even a 7-8¢ price for Yes on "permanent peace agreement before April 30" and "Trump stopping military operations before April 30" seemed overvalued to AdrianCronauer.

The Core Judgment of this Strategy

AdrianCronauer's operations were based on a relatively simple judgment that required continuous validation: In a highly uncertain geopolitical stalemate, major breakthroughs within short deadlines are always overestimated by the market.

He wasn't betting on the specific outcome of negotiations, but on "insufficient time." A permanent peace agreement, a declaration to end military operations, the transfer of enriched uranium – even if these events were to happen eventually, the probability of them being completed within a few weeks was extremely low. When the market priced Yes for these contracts at 1-8¢, the corresponding No was at 92-99¢, offering a yield of only 1-8%, but with very low risk. He used scale to exchange for yield, spreading his $2.1 million across over a dozen related contracts, systematically harvesting the market's optimistic premium.

Where was the risk?

The fatal weakness of this approach is a single black swan event. If Trump had actually declared an end to military operations before April 30, his $529,058 No position would have gone to zero. He bought No at 97¢, meaning he believed the probability of this happening was less than 3%. And Trump's decisions are notoriously unpredictable.

However, looking at the overall information environment in April, this judgment had support: negotiations broke down, bilateral trust was at rock bottom, internal leadership divisions within Iran, the Hormuz channel opening and closing repeatedly. Any of these conditions made the probability of a "formal agreement within 30 days" infinitesimal.

Case 4: How to Replicate Case 3 with Small Capital? The High-Frequency Trading Strategy

Account: 0xcd7..0d127

This account has no story of a single massive win. 2,000 trades, $25.9M total volume, $7,900 average position, 75.5% win rate, cumulative profit of $292,000.

The PnL curve, starting from June 2025, climbs slowly, steadily, almost linearly upward, with no obvious jumps or significant drawdowns.

The Essence of the Strategy: Systematically Shorting Market Panic

Analyst Jay Godiyadada on X offered a sharp observation of this account:

The historical success rate of the Iranian regime in withstanding external shocks is around 95%, but in a panic, the market priced its "regime collapse" Yes at around 20%, causing the corresponding No to be undervalued by 15–20¢. Whenever the market pushed up the price of Yes due to an event (start of war, leader killed, ceasefire breakdown), this account would buy large positions of No, harvesting that excess panic pricing, and then profit as the situation stabilized.

Take the contract "Will the Iranian regime collapse before June 30?" as an example. In the early days of the war, when the situation was most chaotic and uncertain, the price of No was pushed down to around 91¢, implying a nearly 10% probability of regime collapse. He bought in at this point. As the ceasefire took hold and the situation stabilized, the market reassessed the likelihood of regime collapse, and the No price climbed from 91¢ to 95¢, giving his position an unrealized gain of 4%.

In summary, this account was simply trading the range in the prediction market.

The Difference Between This Account and Case 3

While the strategies appear similar on the surface, there is a key difference: AdrianCronauer used concentrated capital, low frequency, and large positions – single bets of $500,000–$630,000, a few contracts, 29 total trades. 0xcd7 used dispersed capital, high frequency, and medium positions – average $7,900, 2,000 trades spread across multiple market categories (Iran, Greenland, Fed Chair), operating continuously for nearly a year.

AdrianCronauer's approach is closer to a single arbitrage play, while 0xcd7 is closer to a market-making logic: continuously identifying Yes contracts overpriced by sentiment, systematically shorting them, and accumulating returns through frequency and win rate.

$25.9M Volume, $7,900 Average Position, 2,000 Trades

This implies the account maintained a very high turnover rate most of the time. This style is more akin to Meme trading, where the trader doesn't wait for settlement but constantly scans the market, intervening when a pricing discrepancy offers a 5-10% margin for profit. A 75.5% win rate over 2,000 samples is statistically significant and unlikely to be luck.

The core competency of this account, as Jay put it, is a "status quo bias"—a systematic bet on "the present will continue." In geopolitical markets, major changes are always overestimated, and gradual stalemates are always underestimated.

Knowing this, and having the capital and discipline to execute consistently, is enough.