港元稳定币「大撤退」

Original author: Joe Zhou, Foresight News

"We are not optimistic about HKD stablecoins." An industry insider close to the regulators told the author bluntly, "Being optimistic about stablecoins does not mean being optimistic about HKD stablecoins — these are two completely different things."

He paused, then added: "Letting the institutions that are least willing and least motivated lead HKD stablecoins, while marginalizing those with the most motivation and the best ideas — how can this possibly work?"

This is not personal bias. The author learned from multiple participants in Hong Kong's stablecoin business that the allocation of the first two HKD stablecoin licenses has already exposed the awkwardness of this "passive defense" style of regulation: Standard Chartered Bank-led Anchor Digit Limited has been proactively pushing forward, while the other licensed institution "doesn't want to do it at all" — this is already an open secret within the industry.

Meanwhile, companies with strong intentions to explore HKD stablecoin use cases, such as Ant Group, JD Technology, and Yuanbi Technology, have failed to truly enter the game or lack core leadership positions.

"Participating, but not optimistic." Two individuals from different institutions, both close to Hong Kong's stablecoin business, said almost in unison.

Currently, the situation of HKD stablecoins is taking on three subtle forms: one type of institution is bullish on the stablecoin track but holds reservations about HKD stablecoins, yet feels compelled to "reserve a seat"; another type is not particularly enthusiastic about stablecoins at all but has been reluctantly pushed into the game by regulators; and a third type has the willingness, resources, and use cases but is shut out due to their identity.

This mismatch is precisely the most telling footnote to the "great retreat" of HKD stablecoins.

One License, Two Attitudes, Three Reactions

Standard Chartered is proactive, HSBC is passive — one license, two attitudes.

In September 2025, 36 institutions rushed to submit applications for HKD stablecoin licenses, creating quite a buzz. Yet nearly a year later, as of August 2026, few people actively mention HKD stablecoins anymore.

Once the noise faded, only two real players remained: Standard Chartered and HSBC. A brand-new business model was ultimately handed over entirely to institutions whose core business remains traditional. Market sentiment has turned ice-cold.

"It's well known throughout the industry that HSBC is not proactive." Two individuals from different Hong Kong licensed crypto exchanges told the author in unison.

On April 10, 2026, the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) granted the first two HKD stablecoin licenses to Anchor Digit Limited (a joint venture of Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong), HKT, and Animoca Brands) and The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC). However, according to industry insiders, the two institutions have starkly different attitudes toward stablecoins.

Standard Chartered has demonstrated a certain level of initiative and has begun laying out its global stablecoin strategy. On July 2, 2026, Standard Chartered and USDC issuer Circle jointly announced the launch of an institutional-grade one-stop USDC access service. On August 12, 2026, Anchor Digit initiated the first phase of issuance of its HKD stablecoin HKDAP, currently limited to institutional distributors such as HashKey and OSL, as well as professional investors, with plans to potentially expand to retail users by the end of 2026 depending on market conditions.

HSBC presents a completely different picture. "HSBC is passive — they only did it because they were pushed into it." An industry insider told the author directly. Compared with Standard Chartered's proactive advancement, HSBC's HKD stablecoin plan is clearly lagging, with a schedule set for the second half of 2026.

Behind this delay lies HSBC's prudent consideration of the stablecoin business based on real-world interests.

"HSBC prefers to promote tokenized deposits rather than stablecoins." A source close to HSBC revealed.

The fundamental reason is that stablecoins directly conflict with HSBC's core business. Data shows that approximately 85% of HSBC's payment business revenue comes from deposit-based net interest income, and payment business itself accounts for about 22% of its total revenue in 2025. HSBC's core business model is precisely about absorbing low-cost deposits and earning spreads through lending and investments — and stablecoin issuance would divert bank deposits, undermining its very foundation.

Moreover, the compliant stablecoin issuance business itself is far from a "windfall profit": revenue is highly dependent on the interest rate environment, while profits are steadily eroded by distribution, custody, and other channel costs. For HSBC, which relies on deposit-loan spreads as its core and holds massive customer deposits, going all in on stablecoins would both erode its deposit base and fail to generate meaningful profits — there is simply no inherent commercial drive.

Beyond Standard Chartered and HSBC, the reactions of the 13 licensed crypto exchanges to HKD stablecoins are also quite telling.

Standard Chartered and HSBC play the issuer role, while distribution, custody, and other aspects rely on licensed crypto exchanges such as HashKey, OSL, EXIO, and Panthertrade. However, based on what the author has learned, the attitudes of these exchanges can be roughly divided into three categories.

The first reaction: zero expectations. "From a commercial standpoint, HKD stablecoins offer no visible opportunity for institutions to profit." A representative of a Hong Kong licensed crypto exchange said bluntly, "What's more, Hong Kong's licensed crypto exchanges are already suffering continuous losses."

"Zero expectations," he said.

The second reaction: retreating while watching. According to the author's understanding, at least three licensed crypto exchanges had been testing HKD stablecoins with Anchor Digit, but some exchanges have begun to pull back, unwilling to invest further effort in various tests.

The third reaction: tactically active, strategically wait-and-see.

"Strategically not active, but tactically active." A representative of another Hong Kong licensed crypto exchange stated. This professional revealed that the team is indeed actively testing collaboration with the HKD stablecoin issuer, but from the company's overall strategic perspective — "everyone knows this is not a business where profit opportunities are currently visible."

Euro in a Fluster, Yen Clumsy, Won Slow, HKD Dragging — All Running in Second Place

The predicament of HKD stablecoins is not unique to Hong Kong. Looking at the broader picture, non-USD stablecoins across global financial centers are almost without exception running in second place.

The euro is in a fluster, the yen is clumsy, the won is slow, and the HKD is dragging — one winner, four also-rans, each with its own difficulties.

Let's start with the euro stablecoin. As the second-largest currency by stored value after the dollar, it appears flustered.

The euro is the world's second-largest payment and reserve currency — SWIFT data shows that in June 2026, the euro accounted for 21.88% of global payment share, second only to the US dollar; in global foreign exchange reserves, the euro accounts for approximately 20%, firmly in second place. A currency that holds a 22% share in international trade and finance has stablecoins that account for only 0.22% of the global market — a full 100-fold gap.

Watching USD stablecoins develop with such momentum, Europe has become anxious and plans to launch a MiCA-compliant euro stablecoin in the second half of 2026. The membership has now expanded to 37 financial institutions across 15 European countries, including BNP Paribas, ING Group, UniCredit, BBVA, and ABN AMRO, among other major European banks.

However, while the 37-bank alliance looks impressive on paper, the reality is much ado about nothing. The euro stablecoin market cap stands at only $674 million, accounting for 0.3% of the global stablecoin market. And most of that 0.3% is held by an American company — Circle's EURC dominates the entire euro stablecoin market with a 64% share at approximately $430 million.

"The yen stablecoin — it's clumsy." An industry insider said bluntly.

"It's not that the technology isn't capable; it's that the institutional design narrowed the path from the very beginning." "There's also no liquidity right now," he added.

In June 2026, SBI Holdings officially launched JPYSC, Japan's first Ethereum-based yen stablecoin backed by a trust bank. Mitsubishi UFJ, Sumitomo Mitsui, and Mizuho — Japan's three major banks — also announced a joint effort to develop their own yen stablecoin, with plans to commence commercial transactions in fiscal year 2026. But the problem is that Japanese regulators have confined stablecoins within the trust bank system — issuers must be trust banks, reserve assets must be held in trust banks, and redemptions must also go through trust banks. After all these requirements, the stablecoin has been effectively reduced to a "shackled electronic certificate of deposit," with almost nothing to do with blockchain programmability.

Japan isn't incapable of building stablecoins — it's that the product they've built is something nobody would get excited about.

The won stablecoin is slow — stalled. It's not that companies don't want to do it; it's that regulators haven't finished arguing.

The pilot program with nine major card issuers has been completed, Busan Bank's pilot transactions on the Kaia Chain achieved a 100% success rate with processing times under one second, and Kakao and Circle's infrastructure is ready — companies are all set, but regulators are still arguing in place.

Arguing about what? About "who gets to issue." The Bank of Korea insists that "banks must hold more than 51% of shares" to issue, which has drawn strong pushback from the industry, which argues that "this isn't stability — it's stagnation." Under Korea's Banking Act, a bank's shareholding limit in other companies is capped at 15% — to reach 51%, at least four to five banks would need to come together. This itself is adding friction to the market.

The Financial Services Commission's bill has been postponed from Q1 to the "second half," and more than once at that. Money can't wait. Korea has seen net stablecoin outflows for 18 consecutive months, totaling over $1 billion — with no domestic issuance possible, users can only convert to USD stablecoins and move funds out.

The "slowness" of the won stablecoin is not a capability problem — it's a decision-making problem.

As for the HKD stablecoin, it's about waiting and dragging. Waiting for the US clarity bill, waiting for banks to move slowly. Market assessment: the HKD stablecoin was the first to be licensed, but has the coldest start — licensed but lacking enthusiasm.

But the bigger problem is: those with use cases can't get in, while those without use cases are forced to participate. Ant wants to do it, JD wants to do it, HashKey wants to do it — they have the willingness, the drive, and the use cases, but they're all standing outside the door. HKD stablecoins were never an active offense from the start — they were a defensive move. Because others were doing it, Hong Kong had no choice but to follow.

The global stablecoin market is approaching $308.3 billion, with USD stablecoins accounting for 98%. The strength of the dollar is one reason, but the slowness of other regions is equally important. And the HKD stablecoin has fallen into an awkward predicament.