历时4个月，Polymarket帮特朗普抓到了军事行动泄密者，但代价是……

Original by Odaily (@OdailyChina)

Author: Golem (@web3_golem)

Not long after, facing the jury, Master Sergeant Gannon Ken Van Dyke would surely recall that moment he stood on the deck of the USS Iwo Jima waiting for the sunrise.

On the night of January 2, 2026, Trump ordered U.S. troops to raid Venezuela and arrest the Maduros. The mission concluded in the early hours of January 3, with the Maduros taken to the USS Iwo Jima for transport to the U.S. Hours later, 38-year-old Master Sergeant Van Dyke, holding a rifle, posed for a photo on deck with three other soldiers and shared it on social media. The atmosphere at that moment was relaxed, but he couldn't share the joy in his heart with anyone.

Because he was a leaker, an insider who used inside information to make huge profits on Polymarket. In the days leading up to the U.S. military operation, Van Dyke placed a series of bets on Polymarket, including whether Maduro would leave office before January 31, 2026, and whether the U.S. military would attack Venezuela before January 31, 2026. Van Dyke placed a total of $33,933 in bets, ultimately profiting over $409,000, a return rate exceeding 1,200%.

Gannon Ken Van Dyke

Van Dyke was not the only one using inside information to profit from this arrest operation. According to monitoring by the Odaily Seer Channel, before the Venezuelan president's arrest, three addresses on Polymarket had placed early bets on his removal, accumulating total profits of $630,400. Among them, address 0x31a5 (0x31a5...8eD9) invested $34,000, profiting $409,000; address 0xa72D (0xa72D...eBd4) invested $5,800, profiting $75,000; and address SBet365 invested $25,000, profiting $145,600.

At the time, there was much speculation in the market about the identities of these insider addresses, but it was not known that the most profitable address specifically belonged to Van Dyke.

To be safe, after seeing reports about insider trading related to the mission, Van Dyke also deleted his Polymarket account and changed the email address registered with his crypto exchange account, attempting to conceal transaction evidence.

Nevertheless, after a joint investigation by Polymarket and the U.S. Department of Justice lasting nearly four months, Van Dyke was ultimately caught.

On April 23, the U.S. Department of Justice announced the arrest of Van Dyke. He faces charges including illegally using government secrets for personal gain, stealing non-public government information, commodity fraud, wire fraud, and conducting illegal monetary transactions. The DOJ stated that Van Dyke is expected to appear in court in North Carolina at a later date, and his defense attorney's information has not yet been released.

This is the first time U.S. authorities have arrested an insider for using confidential information to place bets on a prediction market, and the final verdict could have a profound impact on the widespread insider trading activities that exist in future prediction markets.

But before this, Polymarket's newly released enhanced market integrity rules had actually already made insiders uneasy.

Polymarket's Enhanced Market Integrity Rules

On March 23, Polymarket released enhanced market integrity rules and incorporated them into its terms of use. The new rules explicitly state that insider trading and any trading by individuals who could influence the outcome are strictly prohibited on Polymarket. Specifically, these three behaviors are forbidden:

• Trading using stolen confidential information: If a user possesses confidential information regarding the outcome or potential outcome of an underlying event, and using that information would violate a pre-existing trust or duty of confidentiality owed to another person or entity, that user shall not engage in any contract trading.
• No trading using illegally obtained inside information: If a user knows or has reason to know that the person providing the information would themselves be prohibited from trading on it, that user shall not trade using confidential information obtained from someone with a pre-existing trust or duty of confidentiality.
• No trading when able to influence the outcome: If a user has the power or influence sufficient to affect the outcome of an underlying event, that user shall not engage in any contract trading; users shall also not trade at the direction of someone with such power or influence.

To help users better understand what specific behaviors would be defined as insider trading, Polymarket also provides concrete examples in its market integrity rules on both the Polymarket main site and the U.S. site. Examples include: soldiers cannot bet on upcoming military operations; political election candidates cannot personally bet on their own election results or encourage anyone else to do so; company CEOs cannot personally bet on "mention markets" involving themselves or encourage anyone else to do so.

To effectively combat similar insider trading, Polymarket has also established a multi-layered monitoring system. When Polymarket or the community (Odaily note: any user can now report suspected insider trading activity) detects suspicious trading activity, Polymarket initiates a review, and when necessary, takes disciplinary action, bans wallet addresses, initiates legal proceedings, or refers the matter to law enforcement.

Before Van Dyke's arrest, insiders might have thought Polymarket's market integrity rules were just a bluff. After all, on a platform with no KYC and cryptocurrency settlement, penetrating on-chain addresses to expose insiders hiding behind screens seemed extremely difficult, and Polymarket likely wouldn't want to do such a thing.

But this thinking was naive. First, current regulatory and on-chain tracking technologies are actually quite advanced and powerful. Users may not undergo KYC on Polymarket itself, but they inevitably complete KYC on exchanges and other on/off-ramp channels. Except for top-tier hackers, ordinary users have virtually nowhere to hide from such investigations. Second, to gain support from U.S. regulators, Polymarket actively cooperates with law enforcement in investigating insider trading. For a typical insider case like Van Dyke's, it spares no effort, regardless of the cost in manpower and resources.

Having analyzed this far, if you are someone with inside information on minor events, you might still think you're safe, believing you wouldn't engage in insider trading on such a high-profile event like Van Dyke, or that because you aren't a U.S. citizen, U.S. regulators or Polymarket can't do anything to you.

Of course, Polymarket and regulators cannot treat every instance of insider trading the same way they treated Van Dyke. For small-scale insider trading with limited impact, uncovering the real identity of insiders or pursuing legal action would seem like "making a mountain out of a molehill." But Polymarket has another killer move against these insider trades—address banning. And it is this rule that all insiders and all users truly need to fear. So much so that it is shaking Polymarket's core narrative.

The Cost

On April 23, prediction market Kalshi disclosed that it had fined three congressional candidates who bet on their own election outcomes and banned them from the platform for five years. Did you think they made huge profits? In fact, the total fines for the three candidates were less than $8,000, and one of them had only bet $100.

The ability to handle insider trading so swiftly stems from the KYC and compliance system Kalshi has built since its inception. But if such small-value, low-impact insider trading occurred on Polymarket, it might not even be noticed, let alone dealt with.

This is not because Polymarket subjectively tolerates insider trading, but because self-regulation on Polymarket is inherently very difficult. Due to its lack of KYC, low account creation barriers, and on-chain anonymity, Polymarket finds it difficult to manage and vet users like Kalshi can. This creates a breeding ground for insiders. When the economic incentives for insider trading are high enough and the risks low enough, human nature cannot withstand the test.

Odaily previously analyzed, when insiders used Polymarket to gain illegal profits from the Maduro arrest operation, that insider trading is a double-edged sword for Polymarket (Related reading: When War is Settled Before it's News: How a Prediction Market 'Priced In' the Maduro Arrest Six Days Early).

On one hand, insider trading often means releasing information ahead of mainstream media, which brings Polymarket trading volume and a speed of information disclosure that surpasses traditional media. Pricing in and predicting event outcomes in advance has gradually become Polymarket's core narrative. On the other hand, insider trading also means information leaks prematurely, naturally drawing opposition from stakeholders. Especially when regulators believe insider trading threatens traditional information security, Polymarket needs to choose between its own safety and the advantages brought by insider trading.

Looking at the outcome, the introduction of enhanced market integrity rules has already signaled Polymarket's stance. But the cost is that user trust in the platform may also erode.

Banning user addresses is a sensitive topic for a decentralized platform, as misuse or wrongful bans can trigger user backlash and concerns about fund security. Allowing people worldwide to participate in prediction markets with guaranteed freedom of deposits and withdrawals has always been one of Polymarket's core competitive advantages. But when Polymarket grants itself the power to ban suspicious user accounts, not only will insiders hesitate to trade on Polymarket, but legitimate profitable users will also worry about the platform using this as an excuse to block withdrawals. Once the door to account bans is opened, it may never be closed again.

In summary, while a strict crackdown on insider trading can ensure Polymarket's safety from a regulatory standpoint, it will inevitably weaken Polymarket's foresight and accuracy in predicting event outcomes. It will also add another layer of concern for users regarding their fund security. In the end, a matured Polymarket will become just another ordinary adult.