Jiang Xueqin's Latest Interview: The U.S. is 'Locked In' by War, Any Move Will Shake the Foundations of Global Order

Video Title: Political Prophet Predicts the Next Phase in Iran, Trump's War Plan, & Israel's Plot to Sabotage It

Video Author: Tucker Carlson

Compiled by: Peggy, BlockBeats

Editor's Note:

Recently, a video from two years ago of a lecture on the international situation in a Beijing high school classroom has been widely circulated. The lecturer was Jiang Xueqin, who, based on historical and geopolitical logic, predicted that Trump might be re-elected and that the US might take action against Iran. As some of his predictions have been validated by reality, his YouTube subscriber count has skyrocketed, and he has been dubbed by many netizens as "China's Nostradamus."

On March 21, 2026, he appeared on Tucker Carlson's show, shifting his perspective from "predicting events" to "explaining structures": Why can't the Middle East war stop once it starts? Why is the US caught in a dilemma? And how will this conflict ultimately reshape the global economy and power structure.

Left: Tucker Carlson, Right: Jiang Xueqin

The most noteworthy aspect of this conversation is not the conclusion itself, but the way of viewing the world it provides—treating war as a self-reinforcing system, rather than a conflict that can be quickly resolved.

This conversation can be understood from roughly five aspects.

War as a "System," Not an Event

A core judgment of the conversation is that the Middle East conflict is no longer a war that can be simply concluded through diplomatic means, but a self-reinforcing system once set in motion. In this system, the actions of all parties are gradually locked in by the structure, and the war itself continuously generates new momentum, making "exit" increasingly difficult.

The US Dilemma: Both Continuing and Exiting Are Costly

For the United States, the problem is not whether it has military capability, but the insolvability of strategic choices: continued involvement means higher fiscal burdens and domestic division, while choosing to exit may shake the dollar system and the existing global order. Therefore, the war is inversely affecting the US homeland, amplifying internal contradictions through conscription pressure, fiscal costs, and policy disagreements.

The Arrival of a New Era: Energy and Economic Restructuring

As the era of cheap energy gradually ends, the global economy is being forced into a new phase: deindustrialization, remilitarization, and trade protectionism are returning simultaneously. The logic of differentiation between nations is also changing, shifting from "differences in development levels" to "resource acquisition capability and security assurance capability."

Structural Differentiation in Asia and the Middle East

In this change, regional differences are rapidly widening. Asia no longer exists as a whole: China faces pressure to adjust its export and energy structure; Japan and South Korea are re-evaluating the balance between security and resources; Southeast Asia bears the brunt of energy and supply chain shocks. The Middle East presents another path of division—the security and financial hub status of Gulf countries is being challenged; Iran accumulates new leverage through disruption; and the regional power structure is being reshaped.

The Overlooked Variable: Ideology and Religious Narratives

The conversation also emphasizes that geopolitics is not entirely dominated by rational calculation. Religious beliefs, eschatological narratives, and historical memory still influence decision-making at critical moments. This makes the conflict not only a competition for resources and power but also a tension between different worldviews.

If this conversation provides a clear entry point, it lies in transforming "war" from an isolated event into a systemic trigger: once activated, it simultaneously affects energy, finance, and national structures, pushing the global order into a slow yet profound process of reorganization. From this perspective, the question is no longer about winning or losing a local conflict, but about how the entire world will be reorganized.

The following is the original content (edited for readability):

TL;DR

The Middle East war is a protracted war of attrition that cannot be simply ended through diplomatic means. Once started, it forms a self-reinforcing system that locks all participants in.

The real dilemma for the US is not whether to fight, but that "whether fighting or withdrawing will shake the foundations of the dollar and the global order."

The world is entering a new cycle. The era of cheap energy is ending, and deindustrialization, remilitarization, and mercantilism will return simultaneously.

The core division of the future world is no longer between developed and developing, but the structural difference of "whether resources can be self-sufficient."

Asia is moving towards division. China is constrained by its export and energy structure; Japan and South Korea are forced to choose between security and resources; Southeast Asia bears the brunt of energy shortages and supply shocks.

The security and financial hub status of Gulf countries will be shaken. The global appeal of cities like Dubai will decline; Iran seeks to rebuild amid destruction and re-accumulate resources by leveraging the Strait of Hormuz; and the entire Middle East will move towards long-term turbulence and power redistribution.

The war is inversely affecting the US homeland. Through conscription pressure, fiscal burdens, and controversies over overseas involvement, it continuously amplifies left-right opposition, triggers protests and social conflicts, and further weakens the stability of the political system.

Interview Content

Middle East War: A Protracted War of Attrition with No Exit

Tucker Carlson:

Professor, thank you very much for joining this interview.

We've never met, and I don't know much about you, but I've seen many of your videos where your predictions have been remarkably accurate. I truly admire you, especially your ability to foresee events before they happen.

So, where do you think this Iran war is headed? How will it end? And what consequences might it bring?

Jiang Xueqin:

Thank you very much for the invitation, Tucker. I'm a loyal viewer of yours. I've been following your show for years.

Regarding this Iran war, I believe it will be very similar to the Ukraine war, meaning it will be prolonged and evolve into a war of attrition. Neither side will admit defeat, even though a ceasefire would actually be in their respective interests. This will have an extremely severe impact on the global economy, and this war could last for many years. We are already starting to see effects, such as flight cancellations, fuel shortages in some parts of Southeast Asia, and people being asked to stay home. In a few months, experts even predict food shortages, and countries may have to implement rationing.

Meanwhile, the situation is still escalating: Israel attacked Iran's largest gas field, and Iran retaliated against the energy infrastructure of GCC countries. Iran has clearly stated that its strategic goal is to push oil prices to $200 per barrel, which would have a huge impact on the global economy because the entire global economy is built on cheap energy.

Therefore, I think this war will last a long time. Eventually, the US will send ground troops, the Strait of Hormuz will become a focal point of contention, the conflict will spill over globally, and other countries will be drawn in. For example, Saudi Arabia might declare war on Iran, and Saudi Arabia has a defense pact with Pakistan, which would also drag Pakistan into the war.

The situation is spiraling out of control. And just recently, Ali Larijani, the de facto person in charge of the Iran war, was assassinated. He was a political figure capable of pushing for a ceasefire. With his death, there is almost no "exit channel" left; both sides will be locked in a long-term war of attrition, and the impact on the global economy will be extremely severe.

Tucker Carlson:

I wouldn't say this is the worst-case scenario. After all, the worst-case scenario could include one or more actors launching a nuclear strike, or the destruction of the Al-Aqsa Mosque complex in Jerusalem, triggering a religious war—that would be the true worst outcome. But what you just described is only a step away from that: a protracted, highly destructive war that is almost impossible to stop.

So my question is, since there are so many global participants, and major powers like the US and China would suffer in this conflict, why isn't there enough motivation to end it as soon as possible? Why can't it be done?

Jiang Xueqin:

Right. Once a war starts, it develops its own momentum and logic. The US doesn't really have an "exit path." That is, if the US tries to negotiate a ceasefire with Iran, Iran would likely demand about one trillion dollars in compensation and require the US to permanently withdraw from the Middle East to ensure its own long-term security.

If the US actually does this, then the GCC countries would collectively become vassals of Iran, because only Iran could provide them with security and maintain the operation of this common system. The GCC is the foundation of the petrodollar system; they sell oil in dollars and then recycle the funds back into the US economy. Once this system is abandoned, it would have an extremely severe impact on the US economy and also trigger a chain reaction: Japan and South Korea would draw conclusions from the Middle East situation that the US can no longer guarantee their security, forcing them to remilitarize, and resources originally allocated to deal with potential threats would be redistributed.

Europe would also be affected. They would look at what's happening in the GCC and Southeast Asia and start questioning, "Why are we still fighting Russia?" "Wouldn't it be in our interest to reach a peace agreement with Russia as soon as possible?" This would further shake the dollar's status as the global reserve currency. Remember, the US currently carries $39 trillion in debt, and its economy largely depends on foreigners continuously buying dollars.

The US economy is essentially a Ponzi scheme; it relies on foreigners continuously buying dollars. Therefore, the US cannot actually afford the cost of withdrawing from the Middle East. In other words, the US is already trapped in its current predicament.

Tucker Carlson:

What about China's perspective? I mean, China obviously wants the Persian Gulf to remain stable, especially those seven oil-producing countries. So why doesn't China intervene to help cool down the situation quickly?

Jiang Xueqin:

To some extent, both the US and China benefit from the current structure, but China does have a vested interest in seeing this Middle East war end quickly. About 40% of China's energy depends on the GCC, including not only Iran's oil but also Qatar's natural gas.

As you said, China certainly wants a ceasefire as soon as possible. But the problem is that the Chinese government consistently adheres to the principle of non-interference in other countries' internal affairs. So, although they have publicly stated that they hope the killing and violence in the Middle East will end soon and the Strait of Hormuz will reopen, as I said before, once a war starts, it progresses according to its own logic, and stopping it is very difficult.

Three Major Trends: Deindustrialization, Remilitarization, and the Return of Mercantilism

Tucker Carlson:

So, if your judgment is correct—and of course I pray it's not, and I believe you hope so too—but if this war continues to "grind" on as it is now, continuously destroying energy infrastructure, essentially destroying civilization in the entire region, whether in Iran or GCC countries, then what will the world look like globally in two years? What impact will it have on the global economy?

Jiang Xueqin:

This war will accelerate three main trends, and countries will have to adapt to a new reality: energy is no longer cheap nor easily accessible.

First, deindustrialization. The current scale of urban population is maintained on the premise of being able to import cheap energy and cheap food. Once these two conditions disappear, more people must return to the land to produce food. Therefore, the social structure will be forced to "deindustrialize" while reducing dependence on energy. This will be the first change we will see soon.

Second, remilitarization. In the past, we were in the so-called "Pax Americana," where the US largely maintained global order and prevented wars between nations. For example, Trump once mediated a ceasefire between India and Pakistan. But now, the US no longer possesses that invincible deterrent power, and its military is no longer seen as omnipotent. Therefore, the US can no longer "maintain world peace" as it did before, and countries can only rearm, especially countries like Japan that were highly dependent on US security protection.

Third, the return of mercantilism. As global trade is impacted, countries, especially industrial nations like Japan and Germany, must establish independent, self-sufficient supply chain systems. Fortunately, the US is relatively an exception because the Western Hemisphere is rich in resources and has strong self-sufficiency capabilities; but for Japan and Germany, if they want to maintain industrial strength, they must expand outward, even extending their sphere of influence.

So, these are the three major trends we will see soon.

Structural Differentiation in Asia and the Middle East

Tucker Carlson:

I mean, this dynamic actually appeared very typically in the last century. And I do think Japan is the biggest variable.

Jiang Xueqin:

On the surface, Japan does have many structural weaknesses. For example, an aging population—it has the world's most aged population, which poses a huge constraint on its long-term growth potential. Another example is resource dependence—Japan is highly dependent on imported resources, and its energy transportation routes depend on the Strait of Malacca.

Furthermore, the Japanese economy has been in a long-term deflationary state for the past thirty years, with a heavy debt burden. These are fundamental problems. But from a historical perspective, Japanese society has shown remarkable resilience. In the 13th century, when the Mongols invaded twice, Japan was still a feudal, fragmented society but managed to unite and repel the world's most powerful empire at the time. In the mid-19th century, while China was being carved up by foreign powers, Japan, through the Meiji Restoration, completed its industrial transformation within twenty to thirty years and defeated Russia in 1905. After World War II, Japan was completely devastated, but within one generation, it became a global manufacturing power again.

Therefore, I would not underestimate Japan. There is something in their culture—they are extremely resilient and entrepreneurial. I believe that once faced with a crisis, they will unite as a nation and adapt to these challenges.

Tucker Carlson:

That's a very interesting judgment. I intuitively agree. But considering the historical relationship between China and Japan, China's development momentum, and its strategic focus, would China really tolerate such a strong competitor emerging in the core region of East Asia?

Jiang Xueqin:

China portrays itself as the "Middle Kingdom." You know, "Zhongguo," the Central Kingdom. This means the Chinese believe they themselves are a self-sufficient universe. What happens outside China doesn't truly affect China. Therefore, what's important is safeguarding China's national sovereignty because it is a self-sufficient country with no interest in the outside world. Japan is the complete opposite. It is an island nation; it must obtain resources from other countries to survive as a nation.

So, these are two completely different mindsets. China is largely an agricultural, self-sufficient, inward-looking, and conservative country. Japan is an outward-looking, maritime nation.

Tucker Carlson:

Interesting. It sounds like they can coexist to some extent, at least you clearly stated you wouldn't bet on Japan's failure. What about South Korea? South Korea has one of the lowest birth rates in the world, possibly the lowest, and it is highly "Americanized" in its institutions and social structure. If the US withdraws from East Asia, this would undoubtedly be a major turning point for South Korea. What would happen?

Jiang Xueqin:

Yes, South Korea is in a very dangerous position, mainly because of North Korea. Once the US is forced to withdraw from Southeast Asia, North Korea would gain the initiative. And the problem with this conflict is that Seoul, South Korea's largest city, is only 30 minutes away from North Korean artillery positions. So, within a day, North Korea could flatten Seoul.

Therefore, South Korea's situation is very dangerous. Also, if you look at South Korea's economy, it is a highly oligopolistic, very corrupt system, with the entire economy almost controlled by a few companies. This has also led to extremely intense competition in South Korea, which in turn has led to its extremely low birth rate.

But on the other hand, South Koreans are very hardworking and have a strong historical memory and national consciousness. Therefore, I wouldn't rule out the possibility of some compromise between North and South Korea in the future. In the context of intensified competition between China and Japan, South Korea might even use this situation to gain space for itself.

Tucker Carlson:

That's interesting. I think you make a good point. But I want to follow up on a point you mentioned in passing. You said the South Korean economy is highly oligopolistic, centralized, essentially a monopolistic economy, hence its low birth rate. So, what is the specific relationship between economic monopoly and low birth rate?

Jiang Xueqin:

That's a good question. When an economic system is highly monopolistic, it essentially builds a hierarchical structure, right? Because everyone is desperately trying to get into those companies, which are the most prestigious enterprises in South Korea.