The Sword of Damocles over Hormuz: Five Scenarios, No One at the Helm

Some say this is the most severe oil crisis since the 1970s.

At gas stations in Thailand and Vietnam, fuel is already unavailable, forcing people to work from home; chip factories in South Korea are beginning to worry about helium supply; Japan has already started talking about buying oil from Alaska; food aid agencies in Africa are concerned about where to find food if the war continues for another three months.

All these events are happening simultaneously this week. The impact of the war on the world is more chaotic than we imagined.

Since the Middle East war began, the Strait of Hormuz has effectively been shut down, leaving nearly 20% of the global crude oil and liquefied natural gas supply hanging in the balance. Oil prices have jumped 40% directly from pre-war levels, reaching over $110 per barrel, and Iran has publicly declared its goal is to push that number to $200. Qatar's Ras Laffan LNG facility was bombed, a supply node accounting for 20% of global natural gas trade, and restoring its capacity could take years.

So, when will this war end, and how will it end? BlockBeats has compiled the five most likely scenarios.

Around April, A Swift Conclusion

This is the most ideal scenario, and some analysts believe it's the one Trump most desires: the war will conclude in the short term.

After all, Trump's way of thinking has never been like a general's; he's more like a CEO who, after closing one deal, moves on to the next. He has said it himself: the US has won almost every battle in its history but lost too many wars, not because it couldn't win, but because it didn't know how to exit after winning. Vietnam was like this, Iraq was like this, Afghanistan was like this. He doesn't want to repeat that.

Therefore, in the military operation codenamed "Epic Fury," the US military prioritized "precision decapitation" strikes against senior Iranian regime figures and "demilitarization" strikes against nuclear capabilities, missile facilities, and naval power. Once these "tiger's teeth" capable of threatening the US and its allies are completely removed, Trump plans to transition the military operation into its concluding phase.

According to this scenario's path, the ceasefire point would be around April, aligning with several corresponding timelines.

The first timeline is the visit to China. Trump's original visit to China was planned for late March or early April but has now been postponed to late April or early May. Trump does not want to be in Beijing still entangled in an unresolved "Middle East mess." He needs to appear as a victor to gain greater leverage in US-China trade negotiations. Treasury Secretary Besant also confirmed the postponement was purely due to the need to command the war effort, while trade negotiations in Paris were progressing smoothly. This means the diplomatic path is open, waiting only for the military to finish mopping up.

The second timeline is the midterm elections. With the November midterms approaching, Trump needs a stable economic environment, especially stable oil prices and expectations of a Fed rate cut. If the inflationary shock from the war lasts more than six weeks, it will permeate the entire supply chain and be reflected in summer corporate earnings reports, which would look bad for the Republican Party. Bringing oil prices down from their highs to facilitate a Fed rate cut around September under the guise of an "employment emergency" would secure final victory in the midterms.

Iran's Offer: Buying a Way Out with Oil Commissions

Currently, US-Iran negotiation dynamics present a bizarre "Rashomon" effect: Trump claims progress is smooth, but Iranian Parliament Speaker Kalibaf and official media vehemently deny any contact exists.

Trump recently revealed that the current interlocutors are "a completely different group of people" who have sent a major gift involving oil and gas. Rumors suggest it involves paying the US a 5% commission directly from Iran's oil sales revenue. If true, this is a considerable sum given Iran's export scale.

Who are these "completely different people"? They are likely Iran's regular army (Artesh), not the well-known Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) loyal to the Supreme Leader. Deep-seated contradictions have always existed between these two forces; Artesh is the national army, while IRGC is an ideological tool. When survival pressure becomes extreme enough, it's not unprecedented or impossible for moderates within the regular army to bypass the Supreme Leader and quietly contact the Americans.

But from Iran's perspective, there are political reasons for steadfastly "denying negotiations."

Iran knows Trump places extreme importance on stock market performance. Immediately after the US announced a temporary halt to strikes, global oil prices and US stocks quickly stabilized. By denying negotiations, Iran aims to dilute Trump's economic "dividend," preventing the US from gaining more leverage at the negotiating table. Secondly, it's about maintaining ruling legitimacy. For a Mullah regime reliant on a tough-guy image to maintain power, publicly making peace with the "Great Satan" is political suicide.

Some senior military analysts also point out that while threatening to bomb Iranian power plants, Trump recently temporarily eased sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil exports. This is not weakness but a reflection of Trump's "America First" logic. He needs Iranian oil to continue flowing into the market to stabilize inflation, but he absolutely cannot allow Tehran to control the Strait. This "carrot and stick" approach essentially treats Iran's energy infrastructure as a dynamic lever, using a 5-day grace period to test the other side's limits.

But this scenario has its pitfalls. Strategist Hanson offers a sober assessment: such a compromise is at best a "pause button for the war." Iran's ideological foundation remains unshaken; the next IRGC, the next proxy militia, will inevitably emerge. A more realistic obstacle comes from Saudi Arabia. Crown Prince MBS's attitude is very direct: don't stop halfway. In Saudi eyes, stopping halfway, leaving behind a hateful Iran with room to breathe, is more dangerous than not fighting at all. Saudi Arabia is pressuring Trump to use this historic window to completely eliminate the hardline regime.

Furthermore, analysts note that Crown Prince Pahlavi, who has been in exile in the US for nearly half a century, is gradually becoming the "greatest common denominator" for opposition forces within Iran. Perhaps for the US, blockading the Strait of Hormuz is merely tactical maneuvering, while installing Pahlavi (or a coalition government centered around him) to lead Iran is the true "checkmate flag" that could fundamentally remove the Middle East energy threat and reshape the geopolitical landscape.

Reza Pahlavi, son of Iran's last Shah, in exile

Seizing Islands, Controlling the Strait, Sustained Strikes on Iran

If negotiations break down, or if Trump decides to continue escalating militarily while negotiating, the battlefield focus will shift to the small islands around the Strait of Hormuz.

Qeshm Island, Greater and Lesser Tunbs, Abu Musa—these names are rarely mentioned under normal circumstances, but they control the passage for about one-fifth of global oil trade. Whoever captures these islands holds the "master switch" for the Middle East energy landscape.

Map of Iranian Islands

The US military's strategic intent here is quite clear: bypass the quagmire of Iran's interior and directly control the Strait's "valve." This is a typical "maritime-centric" approach, aiming not for occupation but for a chokehold. The Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa have additional value: they are disputed territories between the UAE and Iran. The US military could capture them and directly hand them over to the UAE, establishing a long-term allied defense perimeter while delivering a significant political gift to Gulf states.

Military analysts point out that signs of further US troop deployments are already quite evident. Recently, 17 C-17 transport aircraft flew intensively to the Middle East, with 6 originating from Fort Bragg, home to the 82nd Airborne Division and Delta Force. The 82nd Airborne's core capability is speed, deployable globally within 18 hours; advance elements are already in place. Amphibious Marine forces arriving from Okinawa and California are responsible for long-term control of larger islands and will need three to four weeks to arrive.

The so-called "five-day window" is actually to wait for heavy expeditionary forces to reach their positions and provide a final terrain reconnaissance period for special operations units.

The most volatile variable among these is Kharg Island. This island handles 90% of Iran's oil exports, giving it extremely high strategic value, but it is covered with large oil storage tanks. If a major fire breaks out, global oil prices would immediately spiral out of control—a result even the US itself cannot afford.

An analysis report from the Hudson Institute points out that in the first ten days of the war, US forces struck over 5,000 targets. This high-intensity "demilitarization" pace is essentially a 21st-century "industrial capacity deprivation war."

Therefore, this view holds that if a swift conclusion is impossible and sustained pressure is applied, further military action is more likely to involve precise control by special forces rather than a hard assault. Because the war's objective is not necessarily to overthrow the Iranian regime but to achieve "tactical weakening," similar to Allied strikes on German industrial capacity in the latter stages of WWII. The goal is to dismantle Iran's regionally accumulated power projection capabilities over decades, including nuclear facilities, ballistic missile production bases, and naval power.

Ultimately, Iran could be weakened into a "large-scale Hamas"—the regime survives but loses its substantive ability to threaten the world for the next 10 to 20 years.

Jiang Xueqin's Prediction: The US Will Lose

Recently, the name Jiang Xueqin has become popular because a video of him lecturing on international affairs in a Beijing high school classroom two years ago has been widely circulated. The lecturer was Jiang Xueqin, who, based on historical and geopolitical logic, judged that Trump might be re-elected and the US might take action against Iran. As parts of his judgment were validated by reality, his YouTube subscriptions soared rapidly, and he has been called "China's Nostradamus" by many netizens. Full interview translation: "Full Text of Jiang Xueqin's Latest Interview: How to View Current Global Changes")

His core assertion regarding this Middle East war is: the US may win every battle tactically, but at the strategic level, it is losing this war.

Why?

First, the US military is too cumbersome, Iran is too agile. Iran has been preparing for this day for over twenty years. It understands US military logic very well and has designed countermeasures for every aspect. The two aircraft carriers—Ford and Lincoln—are indeed there, but because Iran possesses hypersonic weapons and massive swarms of suicide drones, the carriers dare not approach Iran's coastline. The massive steel fortresses have become摆设 floating in the distance. Internal US military war games have repeatedly shown the US would lose, not due to lack of firepower, but because this system cannot deal with such an opponent.

Second, once on land, it's a bottomless pit. Jiang Xueqin views the plan to seize Kharg Island as a classic sunk cost trap. The island is captured, but it's too close to the Iranian mainland to hold. To hold the island, you must control the coastline; to control the coastline, you must penetrate the Zagros Mountains. The mission would expand endlessly like a snowball—this is the Vietnam path. No one intends to take this path, but once on it, it's hard to turn back.

Third, the Shiite theological framework is the variable most easily underestimated by the West. In the Shiite narrative, compromising with an unjust enemy is the true failure; resistance is necessary even if death is certain. The US and Israel choosing to assassinate Khamenei and his family precisely touches the deepest historical trauma of "betrayal" in Shiite history. This will not make Iran submit; it will only make the resistance will of the entire Shiite world burn stronger and harder.

More棘手的是, the US now has no real exit通道. If it withdraws troops, Iran will present an astronomical bill—around $1 trillion in reparations, plus demanding the US permanently leave the Middle East. In that case, Gulf states would collectively tilt towards Iran, the petrodollar system would be shaken, and confidence in US protective capabilities among Japan, South Korea, and Europe would collapse. If it continues fighting, the US's $39 trillion debt and economic structure reliant on foreign purchases of dollars simply cannot support a protracted war of attrition.

Advancing is a quagmire. Retreating is a rout.

Jiang Xueqin paints a后续图景是灰色的: the war evolves into a long-term消耗 similar to Ukraine, Saudi Arabia declares war on Iran and drags Pakistan in, Iran pushes oil prices to $200 per barrel, severe damage to Qatar's LNG facilities导致 20% of global natural gas trade remains offline long-term, and energy crises erupt first in East and Southeast Asia. On a broader scale, three structural trends simultaneously回归: deindustrialization brought by the end of cheap energy, remilitarization brought by the collapse of "Pax Americana," and mercantilism brought by the fragmentation of globalization.

And within the US mainland, if Trump pushes for a national draft, political polarization between left and right would send the National Guard into cities. The US would move towards a state of prolonged骚乱 similar to Northern Ireland's "Troubles"—not civil war, but not much better.

This scenario has no winners, only losers to varying degrees.

Apocalypse Arrives, They Await the Messiah

The final scenario is one many rationalists are unwilling to take seriously because it sounds too much like science fiction. But ignoring it is the truly unserious attitude.

Within Israel, there exists an apocalyptic fervor. Some rabbis and believers no longer view this war through the logic of security or geopolitics; they see it as a catalyst for the "coming of the Messiah." In this framework, the greater the pressure Israel endures, the nearer divine intervention is.

The most惊心动魄环节 in this apocalyptic scenario is action targeting the Al-Aqsa Mosque complex in Jerusalem. The scenario predicts that Israel might利用 the extreme chaos brought by the war,掩护ed by long-term underground "archaeological excavations," to carry out a precise "controlled demolition,"彻底摧毁ing the mosque. This destruction is to clear the ground for building the Jewish "Third Temple."

Because according to religious设想, the Temple's reconstruction signifies the complete复兴 of the Jewish nation and the开启 of the Messianic Age. To divert international pressure and religious outrage, this action might be巧妙地归咎于 Iranian missile误炸 or stray war projectiles, thereby triggering an unprecedented full-scale religious决战 between Persians, Arabs, and Israel.

The "Greater Israel Project" surfaces, expanding territory依据 ancient religious narratives to the vast area between the Nile River in Egypt and the Euphrates River in Iraq, even touching parts of southern Turkey and Saudi Arabia.

By彻底瓦解ing the existing geopolitical格局, it forces all Jews in the Diaspora to return to the land, establishing a new world order led by theocracy.

Supporters in this scenario include the approximately 7 million-member "Christians United for Israel" organization and the庞大的 evangelical community in the US, serving as important financial and moral pillars for such agendas. They sincerely believe Israel is the key支点 for Jesus's return. On a more隐秘层面, the Freemasons, Knights Templar, Rosicrucians, and certain specific factions within Judaism are believed to be参与 shaping policy directions behind the scenes in some way.

Trump's position in this scenario has two interpretations: he might merely be misled by advisors with apocalyptic leanings like Kushner and Rubio, becoming an unwitting actor; or, after surviving impeachment, lawsuits, a shooting, and miraculously returning to the White House, he himself might have developed a "chosen by God" sense of mission.

The介入 of this mystical variable makes this Middle East war no longer a conflict that can be简单地收场ed through diplomatic negotiations. Instead, it becomes a self-reinforcing system once启动, potentially dragging the entire world into an深渊 that reshapes the foundations of civilization and faith.

Al Jazeera recently published an article titled "The US-Israel Strategy Against Iran Is Working," authored by a former US State Department advisor. He argues that this US military action is systematically dismantling Iran's ability to project regional power. Critics only focus on眼前伤亡 and economic costs but fail to see threats accumulated over 40 years being清除ed one by one.

Interestingly, Al Jazeera is素来被视为ed as pro-Arab, pro-Islamic立场. Publishing this article本身说明s one thing: a significant portion of forces in the Middle East already believe the US will win this time.

What will the结局 be? Five scenarios, five outcomes. They may come true individually or overlap.

Trump wants to end it quickly, but the war may not配合 his日程; Iran wants to buy its way out with money, but Saudi Arabia won't allow the war to end just like that; the US military wants to control the Strait, but the cost of island warfare hasn't been fully calculated; Jiang Xueqin says the US will lose, but losing itself has a hundred forms; apocalyptic believers await the Messiah, but history never runs according to religious scripts.

The ship is sailing, engines roaring, the deck is crowded with people, each pushing it with all their might towards the direction they believe is correct.

But no one is at the helm.