Coordinating the relationship between the curation market and the construction of the value network of all things
"One word from a gentleman is hard to follow" "Put your money where your mouth is."
The Curation Market allows teams to align around shared goals (and interests) and benefit from the value they create together. It does this by adding tokenized, benefit-sharing and risk-sharing signals to information curation.
The rules for the creation and curation of tokenized value are built into smart contracts as coordinated Schelling points (focus).It is built on Ethereum, a decentralized world computer.
Leveraging this, collaborators can curate information and share the value created together.
This solves 3 core problems:
1. Own the value you create:Information creators and curators do not derive collective value from the platform.
2. Improve coordination:Difficulty coordinating amorphous groups around common goals, including things like open source projects, global warming.
3. Increase the novelty of information sharing:Manage increasingly rich information with signals of interest.
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Problem: Coordinated Automation
Facing a rapidly changing world driven by automation:The core goal is to be able to monetize the network in a way that allows us to offer new forms of agency to many people and increase the potential for economic coordination on the Internet, without the sluggishness of our previous internet system.
It's not easy to create an organization on the Internet, and it's not even clear that coordinating on the Internet needs to look like a traditional organization. For example, many companies use outlandish legal tricks such as registering in Delaware without the company's headquarters even being in Delaware.
In the past few years,Many began to be allowed to experiment with cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin for global economic coordination. It's very experimental at the moment, and the orgs being created look relatively similar to those already in place. This comes in the form of so-called "appcoins", "protocol tokens", "token offerings", "DAOs", etc. These applications, organizations or ecosystems sell tokens for this network service. A good example of this is Ethereum, which sold about $18 million in Ether using Bitcoin (with participants from all over the world) in order to create a protocol that would allow people to spend this Ether in distributed Computational cost on the Formula World computer.
Read content:
https://medium.com/the-coinbase-blog/app-coins-and-the-dawn-of-the-decentralized-business-model-8b8c951e734f#.qw8vky81g
https://medium.com/@SingularDTV/the-age-of-tokenized-ecosystems-27ad2dfb68d2#.qa3rx7i0n
(Refer to Meme Market White Paper, previously used derivatives with similar design -> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1jm300CyrrAIbXtAopNhkYGqdmMdvUjdVDKcZU9VUdoQ/edit)
There is obvious value in doing this.It allows for the generation of new ideas and provides Schelling/focus around an idea/concept. Internet enables global social groups to form around niche interests. Now, cryptocurrencies allow people who share ideas and beliefs to coordinate economic, political, and social interests.
How to design these systems is still an open question. For example, in the more traditional token offering process, we see designers simply *guessing* how to build the token’s value during the sale.
For example, Ethereum had a flat to linear scale start.
There's no real research showing what's the best way to do it. For new products that are in high demand, sales don't even last for a few minutes. For example, Golem recently raised over $8 million in 19 minutes.
These things could be better structured to better express the need for it. For example, to reduce up-front guesswork and let the market determine the value of tokens,Gnosis Tries a Modified Dutch Auction. Unfortunately, as these tokens are issued, they remain rare, one-off events, leaving those interested in them at a later point in time to join only by purchasing tokens from previous holders .
Cryptocurrencies like bitcoin and ethereum, known as bare-metal currencies, are issued (basically) continuously to pay for the hashing power needed to secure distributed ledgers. Therefore, new participants can join in the future through other means instead of buying from others.
Yet another problem with these token offerings is that it still relies heavily on entities tied to the current legal system.Unable to use tokens to express natural interest and demand for new ideas (eg > clicks, deployments). At some point, we need to enable organizations to automatically create themselves when the market is interested. Or rather, extremely low barriers to entry. The legal system provides protection in a number of ways and allows institutions such as the joint stock company to flourish. However, legal systems are fragmented across the many sovereign nations that exist in the world. They are slow and heavy on the system. The market wants these tokens to exist, but since most tokens are currently created by specific entities, they must go through expensive legal due diligence to protect themselves from potential securities issues. Again, it's not that these legal systems are inherently bad, it's just that it's slow and cumbersome, especially with these new models of coordination that they don't fit anymore. For example, Ethereum is a globally distributed world computer.
So you want organizations and distributed interest groups to form organically and automatically without the need for a centralized organization. You need to be able to navigate what the internet is good at: long tails, weak links, serendipity, and amorphous team coordination. Think: the value of a joint stock company, but for the digital age: a joint attention network or joint stock "meme" if you will。
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Coordination of Protocol Tokens vs Amorphous Groups:
For many tokens that have been released today, their usefulness mainly lies in some specific scenarios. Ether in Ethereum, for example, is the token required to pay gas fees for running computational state changes on a p2p computer.
However, like equity, these tokens also reduce the social transaction costs of people coordinating around a common goal. Just like other forms of value: from beads, shells, fangs, gold, to fiat currency, equity, bitcoin.These tokens help the groups that hold them coordinate with each other. This is because tokens are useless in a vacuum, they represent a tokenized benefit. In very crude terms: you hold a ticket to a show of your favorite artist, and when you see other people holding tickets like that, it immediately breaks the ice.
Likewise, Ethereum’s token, ETH, represents the tokenized interest of an amorphous group of startups and users who all want to share a decentralized computer.These tokens have enormous power to coordinate amorphous groups。
Currently, it is believed that these newly minted tokens need to be used to represent specific protocols or use cases. However, as the barriers to entry for creating curated marketplaces are lowered,Due to the ease of unbundling and creating these network effects, we will likely see this feature of tokenized interests representing the largest portion of value. That said, these tokens do not necessarily represent a specific utility beyond their ability to represent the network and facilitate coordination.
Read more:
There are some great studies and articles that lay out these assumptions:
1. Nick Szabo's "Shelling Out" depicts the value of collectibles in reducing social transaction costs. http://nakamotoinstitute.org/shelling-out/
2. Robin Dunbar's work on the social brain hypothesis, which explains how after a certain group size we rely on other cues to coordinate because the size of our prefrontal cortex deprives us of an accurate picture of a strong society relationship capacity. https://44984771-a-62cb3a1a-s-sites.googlegroups.com/site/dmobbs/relatedness_class/Dunbar_1998.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7cqL6sQmNAJ-vEqo-H33M2kYtChJIH9NFQE6Ni4H6rlFeBJoUtHr8_AO zEVsxSRg-MQd8u0W3mR9Ys8o9z27h9fkWlIOXB14_X5eZrKwwnPYOuQBvrYG43ikYoUELzM0x9AnO9Ew9mKRwQlCJrARLisS9vfhb1Z1dmG5jb71CgXXjS-4HVj59JrCB4SW vjME9_PG_xTNu-LzmnCgFVfhOeNqo3TsiOPqtlXlw49chmBEBD_tCYU%3D&attredirects=0
3. Research on Stigmergy details how individual localized actions lead to complex large corporations. "Thus, the concept of Stimergy provides an intuitive and easy-to-grasp theory for understanding how different, distributed, and ad hoc contributions lead to the emergence of the world's largest collaborative enterprise." http://journal.media-culture .org.au/0605/03-elliott.php; http://www.evolutionofcomputing.org/Multicellular/Stigmergy.html
The interesting thing about stigmergy is that it divides communication tools into signals (real-time: like polls) and cues (traces to the left, like pinned topics). This works very well in blockchain-based signals because you all have access to real-time truth and historical truth (signals remain intact forever, pending reinterpretation). Details will be explained later.
4. Brian Butler has a nice resource-based model of online social structure (which inspired this work). It explains how the design of online communication mediums handles the marginal returns of adding more members. https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Brian_Butler2/publication/220079834_Membership_Size_Communication_Activity_and_Sustainability_A_Resource-Based_Model_of_Online_Social_Structures/links/02e7e5183aa39c13b1000000.pdf
5. This leads to some deeper thinking about the usefulness of eustress in helping social coordination: https://medium.com/@simondlr/eustress-complex-social-systems-design-blockchain-tokenization-5c3e264dc258.
For example, increasing barriers to entry (such as proof of work for collections) can reduce social transaction costs. The concept of Eustress appears in other disciplines as well (eg biostimulation: introducing a toxin into a system to make it stronger).
6. Maciej Olpinski describes a Google for the Economic Web: https://blog.userfeeds.io/building-google-for-the-economic-web-on-the-ethereum-blockchain-de27cb3d23b
7. Finally, the latest book by Meher Roy, who integrates signaling theory into an upcoming blockchain-based attention network: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1eWF47g5UV0RF50GOCUNWh-R4DrKpIrhrjJoKE6nyToU/pub
As he eloquently states at the end:
“A key difference between the job market signal game and attention networks is the code and data structures between the two. Job Market signaling does not have a centrally coordinated rulebook, whereas attention networks do. I think this is the killer app of smart contract technology --The ability to build software rules to facilitate the creation of useful economic equilibria - Attention Networks will be one of many applications. Ethereum and other blockchain systems bring this capability to developers, and no other financial system has a similar capability. This advantage is difficult to explain to the layman. "
Agreement, summary:
A curation market is a type of smart contract on Ethereum for a specific shared goal or theme that allows token minting to be set up via a hard-coded algorithm. The cost of minting tokens (in ETH) increases with the supply (because more tokens are minted). The cost decreases as the supply decreases (tokens are drawn from the supply (“burned”)).
Minted tokens are tied to specific curators in each subtopic chosen by token holders. Use their proportional status in the curatorial community (per topic) and then endorse certain messages (equivalent to a "like"). They can also withdraw their support.
By design: ETH used to mint tokens is either held in public deposits or distributed to trusted beneficiaries. These design considerations depend on what the shared goals are.
Users can choose to leave voluntarily without selling on the secondary market. When players leave, they can take part of the public pool with them as a reward. This reduces supply and hence subsequent cost entry.
Details/details:
There are no requirements for token issuance (participants can purchase tokens for a limited time). Tokens can be minted at any time. This new model has been described as the Continuous Token Model or “Security” Token Model. However, the cost of minting tokens increases with demand for tokens. If people choose to withdraw tokens from the supply and withdraw rewards from the pool, the cost is reduced.
Therefore, based on the current supply, the minting cost is based on a hard-coded algorithm set in the smart contract.This algorithm has a mostly linear curve combined with a slow exponential curve.
algorithm:
costOfToken = (BaseCost +BaseCost* (1.000001618^ availablesupsupply)+BaseCost* availablesupsupply /1000)
therefore,
therefore,
When the supply is 1000, the cost of one token is: $0.01500809654 (price is $50/ETH).
When the supply is 5 million, the cost of one token is: $41.31333111 ($50/ETH).
When the supply is 10 million, the cost of one token is: $53242.33775 (price is $50/ETH).
A token can be divided into 8 decimal places. Therefore, with a supply of 10 million, the minimum denomination would be worth $0.05324233775 (0.000001 tokens).
(to be done: gas cost and new ETH price increase factor))
Once one owns a token, one can decide to withdraw tokens from the supply and be rewarded with a proportional representation of the public pool, allowing token holders to withdraw without having to sell on the secondary market. Once this happens, the cost of the mint is reduced (because the available supply is reduced). For example, if there is a supply of 10 tokens, assuming there are 20 ETH in the public pool, and one person leaves with one token, one can leave with 2 ETH as a reward (1/10 = 10%).
So, the algorithm is set up in such a way that early adopters (those who bought tokens earlier) in the curated market can walk away with a bonus if the supply increases to the point where the lower bound at minting is higher than the upper bound. Proportional shares will be lower (less proportional to the public pool), but the overall value will be higher. Therefore, the price of the token has a rising floor.
As you can notice, there is a ceiling and a floor on which you can come and go as you please. The value of the token will be sucked in this middle ground of the secondary market until it starts hitting a ceiling or a bottom.
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Syndication, coordination and curation:
In order to curate information, tokens need to be tied to specific curators of specific subtopics. It can be yourself or someone else. In some cases, a person will wish to entrust their stake to a person whom he considers to be a good curator. The tokens are still your tokens, but you feel like there are better curators than you. Sometimes this is done for personal gain, as a better curator than yourself will attract more attention and thus make your own token more valuable.
For a particular community (like #Ethereum), one doesn't necessarily want a research curator to curate something useful to traders.
Therefore, each subtopic binds tokens to a specific curator. Each subtopic has several curators. Each curator will be in its subtopic based on the percentage of its bound tags relative to all of the subtopic's bound tags. For example, if there are 100 tokens bound to the topic #truffle.governance (#truffle is the core topic, #governance is the subtopic), and I have 10 tokens bound to my own #truffle.governance topic, then I have 10% of the seats to curate truffle's governance. Similarly, if 1000 tokens are tied to the #truffle.pullrequests topic and I have 200 tokens tied to my own #truffle.pullrequests topic, then I actually have 20% of the seats to strategize develop this topic. The percentage of seats can indirectly refer to a person's reputation.
Once connected, curators can convey whatever message they want on the topic. They can support any information, or withdraw their support. Important signals are: the margin at the time of support and the current amount of margin. Through the use of filters, these signals can be interpreted to reveal information of interest. This is where stigmergic research seems to be relevant, as these signals (real time) and cues (past signals) can be reinterpreted.
For example, #truffle.standards curators signal for which standards they want if they want to coordinate which new standards are adopted. For example, it would look like this:
"25% (25/100) of #truffle.standards curators supported the new web3.js"
Or, if you want to determine whether a pull request needs to be merged:
"83% (8300/10000) of #truffle.pullrequests curators support the merge of issue #431."
Topics are open. Anyone can create a subtopic for anything they want to curate.
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Spin-offs:
Subtopics largely allow for overlap between participants, curating different themes within a larger theme. However, those within those larger topics still have the power to switch their connections between subtopics. Sometimes this is inefficient because it means, for example, that the person curating #truffle.governance should have the same weight as curating #truffle.pullrequests. Or more broadly, an example of opening up the music industry, curating #music.standards is not necessarily the same person as #music.discovery.dubstep.
but in a way,Coordinating the adaptation function will result in the community splitting into its own curated marketplace. This happens when the shared overlap has deteriorated to the point where it is unnecessary to share any more curators.
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Signal commitment:
To demonstrate commitment to the curation market, curator bonds can be chosen to be locked for a certain amount of time. This further reduces shock and coordination intentions on the curation market. A lock period can say: 1 month (when each subtopic is bound to a curator).
There is more room for design exploration here, rewarding those who join together beyond curatorial benefits. Syndication *has* value, as syndication causes curation to happen, thereby bringing attention and attraction to the curation market, which in turn creates value for token holders (because more people will join if they also wish to join the coordination market) .
There are still some interesting design variants here. It can be said that if a person wants to dissolve a union prematurely, he will lose this part of the benefit.
Feedback loops and value:
As stated before: in order to increase the value of the token, the community needs to somehow curate the information so that it attracts the attention of stakeholders who want to be part of the community and coordinate with each other. therefore,There will always be a feedback loop until the use of tokens yields close to zero marginal returns on governance and coordination. To add value, more (and better) management needs to happen, which facilitates coordination.
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Cost Curve: Linear vs Step/Batch
As shown, the curve is mostly linear and adjusted for the token supply. One of the features of these sequential models is that it reduces the FOMO of the capital coming in during the token launch. In crypto trading terms: If the supply is constrained, there will be more buying and selling.
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Trapezoidal/Batch Cost Curves (step/Batch Cost Curves)
Reference reading:
Reference reading:
1. https://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/eric.budish/research/HFT-Frequent Batch Auctions . pdf
2. Bulk Auctions in Ethereum: http://cdetr.io/smart-markets/
This is worth exploring as an alternative to the cost curve.
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Curation Markets with beneficiaries.
The default state is that usage of the curated marketplace has no beneficiaries. It's not that complicated, and it's just for coordinating a group of people around a common topic. However, curation marketplaces can be used to spin off and create "curation organisations", but in other cases it's just about curating sharing information, not necessarily achieving specific goals that require interaction with other marketplaces. For example, the topic #gaming does not necessarily require the help of beneficiaries.
In some cases, curation markets can independently fund beneficiaries through the minting process by having a hardcoded protocol distribute created tokens to hardcoded beneficiaries. So, in other words, when minted, the person who bought tokens with ETH gets 10 tokens, while the hardcoded beneficiary gets 1 token. For any purchase, the beneficiary gets some tokens.
In some cases, separate beneficiaries are essential to furthering a common goal. Beneficiaries can then decide to use their tokens for curation as they see fit (since they are an essential part of the functionality of the curation market), or they can choose to sell their tokens in order to further a common goal. develop.
An example is using a personal curation marketplace: Use this setup to curate individual attention. In order for individuals to sustain themselves, they need capital. In this way, this particular iteration of the curation market becomes a personal attention market. So this is a more direct way of curating the marketplace (one) to profit from it without involving them directly in it.
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Beneficiaries earning income through tokens vs through ETH.
Another option for token yield beneficiaries is the eth yield beneficiary. Compared with other tokens can be divided,ETH is only split between the public pool and beneficiaries (as if beneficiaries would receive the tokens and sell them immediately)。
This gives beneficiaries more direct agency as they don’t have to go through public deposits to sell their tokens against the rest of the market.
However, at odds with ETH benefit beneficiaries, while beneficiaries receive ETH to fund their businesses (and further a common goal), they gain no leverage in the curation market itself. If the curation marketplace wants to curate/instruct beneficiaries how their funds need to be spent, then beneficiaries have no say. Also, the beneficiary's incentives are slightly distorted as it can acquire ETH, buy tokens, get more ETH (just spent), buy tokens, etc. in a feedback loop and take over the curation market. This is not efficient. Then, the curation market community also needs to fully trust their beneficiaries.
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Bootstrapping with issued tokens
In some cases, creating a curated market of beneficiaries with a common goal will only work if the initial capital allocation is large. For example, if a management community wants to jointly develop shared, open-source hardware, in order to put it into production, you need economies of scale,Therefore its initial development and deployment requires a bootstrapping phase. (Remarks: Bootstrapping usually refers to the entrepreneurial model of not asking for help, which means self-help and not asking for help.)
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Curated Market Ranking
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The Risks of ETH as Collateral
One risk of the curation market is that it uses ETH as collateral for public deposits. Therefore, considerations for token holders also need to be weighed against the value of ETH in deposits. In a situation where volatility is likely to occur, ETH transactions are more valuable, so it is more appropriate to maintain token liquidity instead of binding it for curation.first level title
Emergence: Bartering Coins
Ultimately, requiring participants to earn ETH in order to participate is an obstacle if people want the system to succeed in wider society. It also means that anyone who holds ETH is a good curator because they can easily access the curated market and get information. Different cost curves per theme alleviates the problem of curation being manipulated by ETH giants by giving early adopters a greater advantage in curation. However, the problem has not been completely avoided. therefore,Ideally, it is hoped that the ability to mint tokens in the future should not be limited to capital that already exists (in essence).
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Big Curated Market, Curated Curated Market
Many curation marketplaces are expected to experiment with different currencies and Schelling points. This will hopefully lead to effective curatorial design. Depending on the shared algorithm, the core system may remain the same --> minting tokens. These tokens are then used to support messages in order to add interest-related signals to them and for curation.
So, for some topics, there may be more than one curated marketplace.
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Therefore, there is still a need to determine what kind of curation market is the best curation market? Therefore, a large curation market will help to eliminate the relative influence of various curation markets. As mentioned earlier, curated marketplaces may have innate rankings depending on the algorithm used. This can help indicate the relative strength of each curation market on each topic, but there may still be some information asymmetry.
So a curated marketplace for curated marketplaces would be helpful.
If it works, we'll hopefully go back to the original concept of a meme marketplace, including a global, shared namespace for coordination. A curated marketplace helps alleviate some of the problems of having a global namespace, since it is no longer possible to squash a topic.
All memes (according to Dawkins) will have a monetizable network effect. Anything that has an impact on the world (deeply embedded in the long tail) has a tokenized value.
Voting Progress: DAO Committee 4/7 passed
DAOrayaki DAO Research Bonus Pool:
Funding address: 0xCd7da526f5C943126fa9E6f63b7774fA89E88d71
Voting Progress: DAO Committee 4/7 passed
Total bounty: 200 USDC
Types of research: DAO, Curation Markets , Incentive Mechanisms, Governance Mechanisms
Original Author: Simon de la Rouviere. Engineer of Societies @ ConsenSys.
Contributors: Yofu, DAOctor, Trinity @DAOrayaki
Original: Curation Markets
