On-Chain Governance and DAO Must-Read Articles Recommended
Editor's note: This article mainly introduces the current situation of blockchain governance and DAO, sponsored byMamoto Satoshi Community"andmedium、Vitalik Buterin's website、aragon、ethresear、tokeneconomy、hackernoonandkronosapiens, the article mainly includes the following main contents:
The Story of Irrational Token Holders
Blockchain Governance: Weaving Our Future
Against On-Chain Governance, Refuting Fred Ehrsam's Governance Blog Post
A Few Comments on Blockchain Governance
Thoughts on Governance and Network Effects
Interpretation of DAICO
Why 2019 Will Be the Year of the DAO
Moloch DAO: Breaking the corporate system
The current state of DAOs
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1 The story of the irrational token holder
By Kathleen Breitman
Kathleen Breitman is the wife of the founder couple of Tezos. Tezos is one of the most prominent projects in the blockchain and labeled blockchain governance. This is mainly Kathleen's sincere views on blockchain governance and Tezos governance design.
Blockchain governance does not fit perfectly into any existing model.
Tezos has no concept of registered identities, so all decisions about protocol changes will be weighed in proportion to the amount of tokens a participant owns. We view proportional voting based on token ownership as a desirable feature of our governance system. It has also been said that there are similarities between the corporate governance structure and Tezos, part of the reason for this comparison is that we use representative voting (liquid democracy)
We may see a lot of corporate governance failures, but we believe there is a key distinction when looking at blockchain as a specific use case. The only asset of a blockchain-based network is the belief of the people using it. Cryptocurrencies are like fiat currencies in that people believe that other people will find them valuable and want to hold them.
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https://medium.com/tezos/the-myth-of-the-irrational-token-holder-c12438709afd
2 Blockchain Governance: Weaving Our Future
By Fred Ehrsam
Fred Ehrsam is the co-founder of Coinbase and a partner at Pradigm Capital. His point is that blockchain governance design is the most important issue of blockchain, the key components of blockchain governance, current methods, potential future methods, and put forward some suggestions for the community.
I think governance is the most important issue in this field. Other fundamental problems like Scalability can arguably be solved by using governance to set people the right incentives to solve the problem. However, there has been little research on governance and little is known about it. Two key components of governance are incentives and coordination mechanisms.
bitcoin
bitcoin
The incentives are 1) developers: increase the value of existing token holdings; 2) miners: increase the value of existing token holdings; 3) users: increase the value of existing token holdings.
The coordination mechanism is off-chain, with developers coordinating through the Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) process and mailing lists. Miners can coordinate on-chain on their own chain.
Ethereum
Ethereum
Ethereum's systemic incentives and coordination mechanisms are currently similar to Bitcoin. As Ethereum moves to PoS, the dynamics will change. "Verifiers" with a sufficient amount of Ether will displace the power of miners. This is especially true since solutions like 1protocol allow even the smallest Ether holders to participate, making the difference between miners and users even more Flat, and it is possible to reduce the risk of centralization like Bitcoin.
The weaknesses of the current mainstream governance model include: 1) excessive reliance on its creator (Vitalik); 2) limited ways for Bitcoin to motivate core development, forcing more developers to engage in projects and create tokens to support themselves.
The Double-Edged Sword of On-Chain Governance
On-chain governance is a double-edged sword. On the plus side, it helps ensure processes are followed consistently, which can improve coordination and fairness. The downside is risk, because once established, the metasystem becomes harder to change. For some use cases, going static might be fine. This is especially true for stores of value.
Then Fred also introduced several governance strategies that may be implemented in the future:
– Futarchy: Society defines its values, then uses prediction markets to decide what actions maximize those values.
– Liquid Democracy: Everyone has voting rights, a system that gives voting rights to others and revokes their voting rights at any time (more and more PoS systems are using this).
– Quadratic voting: is a system of buying votes where each additional vote costs twice as much as the previous one. In other words, money buys tickets, but the returns keep falling.
Fred's summary:
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https://medium.com/@FEhrsam/blockchain-governance-programming-our-future-c3bfe30f2d74
3 Against on-chain governance, refuting Fred Ehrsam's governance blog post
By Vlad Zamfir
This article is an interesting one, a rebuttal by Ethereum star developer Vlad Zamfir to what Fred wrote in the second article above.
There is no question that governance decisions matter, and go a long way. The structure of a blockchain governance process can significantly affect governance outcomes. However, this does not make blockchain governance a design issue. Look at the system before asking for a revolution, he has very little understanding of how the Ethereum governance process works, everyone just assumes that Bitcoin governance and decision-making is terrible, Ethereum is completely in the hands of Vitalik, but the rule of man inside the system is not. see and understand.
Against On-Chain Governance
Adopting on-chain governance is extremely risky as it always represents a revolution. This is not necessarily a rebellion against the governance process of merging code into software repositories (since it is conceivable that such code could be encoded on-chain, although this is not usually suggested), but a revolution that overturns governance The process of the whole node.
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https://medium.com/@Vlad_Zamfir/against-on-chain-governance-a4ceacd040ca
Author: Vitalik Buterin
Author: Vitalik Buterin
This is written by Vitalik, the founder of Ethereum. This article also has a premise. It is based on the opinions of Vlad against Fred’s article above. On the whole, he supports Vlad, but his attitude is more moderate and more neutral.
In my opinion, on-chain voting is overrated and the current state of "informal governance" practiced by Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Ethereum, Zcash and similar systems is far less bad than people think. If the purpose of the blockchain is to completely eliminate direct human communication, the feeling in favor of full algorithmic governance (emphasis on "full") feels absolutely insane, and underestimates the loosely coupled voting done by hashrate voting and similar systems.
On-Chain Governance Makes Minority Fragmentation Easier? And unbundling constantly destroys network effects. Emphasis on "governance"; such a concept of governance is meaningless without mentioning coordination games (or more generally, multi-equilibrium games)
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https://vitalik.ca/general/2017/12/17/voting.html
5 Thoughts on Governance and Network Effects
By Luke Duncan
Written by Luke Duncan, a researcher at Aragon, this post discusses governance and its impact on the network, and why both are relevant to where value flows and how it is captured in a tokenized blockchain network. Finally, governance as a service (GaaS) was brought out, which milked a wave of Aragon.
Creating governance tokens or adding governance rights to existing tokens can be very powerful if you are building a product that relies on network effects. It increases the voices of network participants and makes network effects more resilient.
There are many potential approaches to token-based governance, including quadratic voting, liquid democracy, minimalist democracy, and many others that deserve attention.
Each process has different advantages and disadvantages, some obvious, while others may require an experimental implementation to discover. It is unclear what the ideal governance mechanism is, or if there is an effective "one size fits all" mechanism. However, it's clear that finding better mechanics is extremely valuable.
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https://blog.aragon.org/thoughts-on-governance-and-network-effects-f40fda3e3f98/
Author: Vitalik Buterin
Author: Vitalik Buterin
This is Vitalik offloading ETH Research's DAICO explainer, a brief description of the idea of improving the ICO model by incorporating some of the benefits of DAOs, but doing so in a way that minimizes complexity and risk. This is mainly about his design ideas, and the comments below are also very exciting.
The idea is as follows. DAICO contracts are issued by individual development teams looking to raise funds for their projects. The DAICO contract begins with a "contribution model," specifying a mechanism by which anyone can contribute ETH to the contract and receive tokens in exchange. This could be a cap sale, an uncap sale, a Dutch auction, an interactive token offering, a KYC auction with a dynamic cap per person, or any other mechanism the team chooses. Once the fundraising period is over, the ability to contribute ETH ceases and an initial token balance is set; from there tokens become tradable.
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https://ethresear.ch/t/explanation-of-daicos/465/15
By Stefano Bernardi
By Stefano Bernardi
Stefano Bernardi is the executive director of the Aragon project and one of the editors-in-chief of TokenEconomy. The article mainly writes about 6 trends he observed that may drive experiments in decentralized organizations.
The six trends are:
Talent Globalization and "Work" Transformation
The Rise of Decentralized Finance
The Rise of Decentralized Finance
Participate in Governance Standardization
De-platforming becomes an important issue
The Rise of Political/Social Organizations
These trends have created interest and demand for DAOs. He then gave a lot of interesting examples, Gitcoin, which allows the open source community to incentivize and profit from their work. Espresso, a decentralized data store that integrates with aragonOS, allowing DAO teams to share files without relying on Dropbox or Google Drive; and Planning Suite, another Aragon application that provides a collaborative planning model that enables Multiple and diverse stakeholder groups within an open source or decentralized organization are able to coordinate the use of shared resources. Finally, one of the most interesting projects in this space is Pando, which actually turns creative projects with multiple collaborators (from books to music to video games) into DAOs. There are many examples in the field of decentralized finance. MakerDAO is an increasingly important project where 0x is transitioning to community governance. Late last year, Melon went public about its proposed governance approach.
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https://tokeneconomy.co/why-2019-will-be-the-year-of-the-dao-20f18117e4c1
Author: Simon de la Rouviere
Author: Simon de la Rouviere
MolochDao is a DAO planned and established by the founder of Spankchain and his good friends. This DAO has also successfully ignited the cryptocurrency community's attention to DAO again.
The gist of Moloch DAO: A novel organizational design whose primary purpose is to more efficiently coordinate resources for issuing Ethereum development grants. (So, sort of like Ethereum's dev union)
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https://medium.com/@simondlr/the-moloch-dao-collapsing-the-firm-2a800b3aa2e7
Author: Vu Gaba Vineb
Author: Vu Gaba Vineb
This is one of the best articles on the history and present of DAO (I don’t think there is one in my opinion). The author’s definition of DAO is an organization run by people who cooperate with each other through a trustless protocol, and can make a collective effort for a certain cause. decision making.
Bitcoin — The Original DAO
Essentially, it's an organization run by miners and full nodes that coordinate with each other through the Bitcoin protocol to collectively decide which transactions to include in the main chain of the Bitcoin blockchain and in what order. The organization's reason is simple: to protect the Bitcoin network and facilitate transactions on it.
DashDAO — the first "meaningful" DAO
In this DashDAO, anyone can pay 5 Dash to create a proposal seeking funding. Dash Masternodes vote on which proposals should or should not receive funding. The decisions to be made in DashDAO are about how to allocate funding pools for real-life proposals to ultimately foster Dash adoption.
DAO - The Notorious DAO
The decisions to be made in a DAO are similar to DashDAO: how to allocate a pool of funds for real-life proposals, and ultimately return the proceeds to the DAO. Unfortunately, it ended early, with a bug in the DAO's code that led to the infamous hack.
MakerDAO - Administrative DAO
The decisions to be made in MakerDAO are basically adjusting the configuration of the entire system and triggering an emergency shutdown if necessary. The configuration to be determined includes the parameters of the CDP type, the type of CDP to be added, and the set of price oracles for the collateral type, etc.
Aragon DAO - Plug and Play DAO
With Aragon, you can now easily create a simple DAO in just a few steps. In such an Aragon DAO, you can distribute stake to an initial set of members, vote on new members' stake, vote on releasing funds from your DAO, or be binding on just about anything.
DigixDAO — Gold DAO
Decision making in DigixDAO is similar to DashDAO: how to allocate capital pools to real-world projects in order to promote the adoption of DGX.
MolochDAO — Incentivized Alignment DAO
There are two types of decisions in MolochDAO: First, who is accepted into the union. This is to better align the interests of new entrants with the union. Second, how to allocate new shares (essentially diluted shares) to proposals that should increase the value of the union as a whole.
DAO Stack and DxDAO - Anarchist DAO
DAO Stack (a framework for creating DAOs), DxDAO by DAOstack The original purpose was to manage the parameters of the DutchX protocol. DutchX is a novel and fully decentralized exchange protocol using the principles of Dutch auctions.
Polkadot — Meta-protocol DAO
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https://hackernoon.com/the-state-of-the-daos-b7cba318460b
By Daniel Kronovet
By Daniel Kronovet
Written by Tel Aviv-based data scientist Daniel Kronovet from the Colony team, this article mainly compares and contrasts the basic highlights of four important Ethereum DAO projects (Aragon, DAOstack, Colony, Moloch).
Aragon is arguably the most high-profile DAO project, and one of the largest of the projects discussed in this article. Aragon is more focused on providing a secure and general backbone for general organization formation, rather than building products around specific decision-making mechanisms. On the one hand this is very practical and attractive: by leveraging the foundation established by the Aragon team, end users only need to use the tools provided by Aragon to quickly form organizations that meet their own specific specifications.
DAOstack clearly attaches importance to the decentralized decision-making mechanism, and this project focuses more on solving the inherent problems of large-scale decentralized decision-making. The most noteworthy achievement of DAOstack is not technically, but its "holographic consensus" cryptoeconomic mechanism. Efficient and reliable approximation of group decision making using a small number of actors (a hologram is an image in which each part contains all information about the whole). What this mechanism does is incentivize a network of "predictors" to bet on whether a proposal will pass; this prediction (along with many other rules) is then used to decide whether to emphasize the proposal, as well as modify the number of people required for the proposal to pass (e.g. A highly promoted proposal may only require a smaller total voter turnout to approve).
Colony chose to focus on the day-to-day of running the organization. Colony focused on minimizing the need for voting in day-to-day operations, using "no permission required" as its rallying cry. A series of resource allocation mechanisms that use time to achieve "permission-free". Time works in groups in two key ways: Earned reputation decays over time. The greater the reputation for supporting a proposal, the faster funding will be obtained
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http://kronosapiens.github.io/blog/2019/06/16/aragon-daostack-colony-moloch.html
